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Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures
The Confucius Institutes are Chinese government-backed nonprofit
organizations that promote Chinese language and culture. They are
housed on collegiate campuses and designed to complement Chinese
language and cultural studies by providing teachers, curriculums,
textbooks and other educational materials. Their establishment has been a
source of controversy, especially in the United States, due to the institutes’
close ties with and the financial, administrative, and political support they
receive from the Chinese government. Critics have had two primary
concerns: that the Confucius Institutes provide the Chinese government
access to increase soft power by issuing propaganda and that their
presence on American collegiate campuses interferes with academic
independence.
How are the Confucius Institutes being received in the United States?
Are they effective in enhancing Chinese soft power? Does Hanban
funding unduly influence American college administrators and educators
and/or restrict academic independence?
This thesis will illustrate that the debates surrounding the Confucius
Institutes on American collegiate campuses are driven more by
international systemic changes and increasing competition between China
and the United States than concerns of preserving academic integrity.
Furthermore, it will show that the influence of Hanban and the Confucius
Institutes does not significantly threaten academic integrity at those
institutions. This thesis will contribute to existing academia by providing
a comprehensive overview of the Confucius Institutes and how they
operate, surveying the theories that affect various viewpoints in the
debates over the Confucius Institutes and analyzing how coverage on the
Confucius Institutes is framed in academic literature and mass media.
Keywords: China’s rise, soft power, Confucius Institutes
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Chapter One: Introduction

The Confucius Institutes are non-profit institutions established by the Chinese
government in foreign countries with the stated intent of promoting Chinese language and
culture in those countries.1 Directed by the Beijing-based Office of Chinese Language Council
International (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi, or as
colloquially known, Hanban), the Confucius Institutes support local teaching of the Chinese
language in foreign countries by providing teachers, curriculums, textbooks and other resources
and materials. The Confucius Institutes also administer the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK), a
Chinese standardized language examination which tests proficiency for non-native speakers.
Finally, the Confucius Institutes also facilitate cultural exchanges by hosting Chinese cultural
festivals and cultural lecture series.
The establishment of these institutes has been controversial, especially in the United
States, for various reasons. First, unlike many of their international counterparts, the Confucius
Institutes are not non-governmental organizations; they were founded and remain funded and
directed by the Chinese government through Hanban and the Department of Education. Second,
the Confucius Institutes tend to operate on American university and college campuses. These
first two reasons combined raise concerns that, at best, academics and administrators at
institutions hosting Confucius Institutes will engage in self-censorship in order to maintain
Hanban funding or, at worst, the Chinese government will use the Confucius Institutes to engage
in foreign espionage. Finally, some observers, especially in foreign policymaking circles, have

1

Confucius Institute Online, “Confucius Institute Headquarters,” Confucius Institute Online,
http://english.chinese.cn/confuciusinstitute/article/2011-05/31/content_339769.htm (accessed February 01, 2012).
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raised concerns about the Confucius Institutes as an indicator of China’s growing soft power and
a tool of the so-called Chinese “charm offensive.”2
This thesis will illustrate that the debate surrounding the Confucius Institutes at American
universities is driven more by changes in the international system and increasing competition
between China and the United States rather than concerns of preserving academic integrity. It
will also show that, while the risk of self-censorship exists among academics and administrators
at institutions that host Confucius Institutes, the influence of Hanban and the Confucius Institutes
does not significantly threaten academic integrity at those institutions.
This chapter will serve as an introduction to this thesis. It will begin with an overview of
China’s economic and military rise and how it has been perceived both internationally and
domestically in China. It will then continue with a brief introduction to interplay between
Chinese nationalism, Chinese soft power and the Confucius Institutes. This chapter will
conclude by providing an outline to this thesis and highlighting the research questions that will
be explored throughout it.

1.1

China’s Rise
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has pursued an export-oriented trade strategy

and policies of trade liberalization. They have taken steps to stabilize the People’s Bank of
China and the Chinese financial system at large, primarily by massively lowering interest rates,
maintaining a closed capital account,3 and implementing a system of state-owned enterprises and

2

Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007): 68; Geoffrey York, “Beijing uses Confucius to lead charm offensive,” The Globe and Mail,
September 9, 2005, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/beijing-uses-confucius-to-lead-charmoffensive/article986321/ (accessed November 25, 2013).
3
Dani Rodrik, “Trading in Illusions,” in Debates in International Political Economy, ed. Thomas Oatley (Boston:
Longman, 2010): 290-293.

2
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select privatization to provide competitive advantages internationally and promote profitability. 4
Though this has led to accusations by some international competitors of unfair trade practices by
the Chinese government, there is no doubt that this strategy has resulted in massive economic
success for China. Since the end of the Cold War, China has generally enjoyed fast, double-digit
year-on-year GDP growth. According to World Bank data, China’s growth remained
impressively steady throughout the last two decades, especially when compared to many of its
more developed Asian neighbors; this culminated in China surpassing Japan as the world’s
second largest economy in 2010. In fact, during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China’s
economy continued to grow while the rest of the major Asian economies contracted. 5
Along with its rapid economic development, scholars have noted China’s fast growth in
military spending since the end of the Cold War. In its 2013 annual report on the military power
of China, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China’s actual defense expenditures
potentially doubles its official budget, which has ballooned from under USD 10 billion dollars
per year during the mid-1990s to approximately USD 114 billion dollars in 2013.6 Another
cause for concern among some security analysts is China’s ongoing efforts in military
modernization, as it continues to invest in “advanced short- and medium-range conventional
ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons and military
cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions;”

4

Feng Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1995): 150-153.
5
World Bank, “GDP Growth (annual %), World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
(accessed 02/19/2013).
6
United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China, 2013, prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2013): 45.

3
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analysts point to China’s acquisition and/or deployment of cruise and ballistic missiles, aircraft
carriers, submarines, combat drones, air fighters and bombers as indicators of a growing threat
and increasingly offensive Chinese military posture. 7
The combination of fast economic and military growth has fueled the international debate
on China’s rise and potential threat among analysts. Some argue that China has become a real
and imminent threat to the status quo in the current international system and to American
interests.8 These analysts borrow from Organski’s power transition theory, which argues that
war is cyclical and emphasizes the aspirations of rising powers and their potential to launch wars
against the existing powers they catch up with in order to achieve those aspirations. 9 Differential
rates of economic growth and how they shift the distribution of world power among states is
especially important, as policymakers are more likely to miscalculate if rising powers grow
rapidly and policymakers have less time to adjust to change. If applied to China, this pessimistic
and alarmist theory would posit that China, which has quickly caught up as a major economic
and military world power, is now in a position to challenge the United States as the dominant
superpower.10 Proponents of this viewpoint are concerned that once this happens, China will use
its power to revise the international status quo, which will have grave implications for the United
States and others that benefit from the current system and distribution of power.
If China’s economic rise and recent advances in strategic weaponry are accompanied by
the desire to revise the international status quo, one facet that could be impacted is China’s
nuclear policy. Since becoming a nuclear power, Beijing has touted their “no first use” nuclear
7

United States Department of Defense 16.
Bernstein and Munro; J. Michael Cole, “China Advertises Itself,” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit:
Greenhaven Press, 2010), 153; Elizabeth Freund Larus, Politics and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012): 391; John J Tkacik, Jr., “Panda Hedging: Pentagon Report Urges New Strategy
for China,” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2010): 122-128.
9
Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in
Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989): 174-175.
10
Tkacik, Jr., 123-125.
8
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policy11 and participated in international organizations that work to limit the global nuclear threat,
such as the UN, IAEA, and NSG.12 However, some security analysts have pointed to recent
public statements and shifts in China’s nuclear policy as evidence of Beijing’s desire to revise
the international status quo.13 Chinese military aggression towards Taiwan also raises the
potential for conflict, especially with the United States,14 as Washington has displayed an interest
in protecting Taiwanese sovereignty since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.
Recent developments in Chinese-Taiwanese relations, such as the increase in trade and tourism
and efforts to remove landmines from the Taiwan Strait, have led some to believe that tensions
are significantly decreasing between China and Taiwan. 15 Analyst J. Michael Cole has argued
that, despite the appearance of easing tensions, China has been increasing its pressure on Taiwan
in a very menacing way in order to get Taiwan to submit to reunification. 16 He states that “[the]
only reason we have been hearing about ‘peace’ in the Taiwan Strait since [KMT candidate Ma
Ying-jeou] came into office [in 2008] is that unlike the DPP, his government has allowed itself
to be intimidated by China’s saber rattling.” 17 However, most security analysts believe that
Chinese aggression against Taiwan would be deterred by ‘the virtual certainty of U.S.
intervention.”18
Finally, Sino-Japanese relations have sharply deteriorated over disputed islands in the
East China Sea – the Diaoyu to the Chinese and Senkaku to the Japanese. Sovereignty over the
uninhabited islands, located next to a continental shelf believed to contain oil, has been difficult
11

Richard H. Ullman, “No first use of nuclear weapons,” Foreign Affairs 50:4 (Jul 1972): 669-683.
Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, “Engage China in Nuclear-Proliferation Issue,” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit:
Greenhaven Press, 2010), 139.
13
Tkacik, Jr., 125.
14
John Bryan Starr, Understanding China, 3e (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 351.
15
Clifford Coonan, “Slow Thaw in China-Taiwan Relations,” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit: Greenhaven
Press, 2010), 155; Larus 387-388.
16
J. Michael Cole, 153.
17
J. Michael Cole, 153.
18
Tkacik Jr., 127.
12
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to determine due to competing historical records and different interpretations of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 19 On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government
agreed to nationalize three islands that had been privately owned for ¥2 billion; China expressed
outrage over the move and deployed patrol vessels to the disputed area. Nationalist
demonstrations have occurred on both sides and tensions between China and Japan have risen to
the highest level since WWII, increasing the possibility that the territorial dispute may escalate
violently. 20 If the dispute does become violent, there are also implications for the relationship
between China and the United States given the ongoing security relationship between the United
States and Japan, as outlined in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Others dispute this pessimistic assessment by challenging the assumption that China is
currently in a position to be a real threat to the international system. 21 These critics generally do
not deny the possibility that relations between the United States and China could worsen –
however, they insist that this outcome is neither definite nor unavoidable. Former Singaporean
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued that while Sino-American relations are “both cooperative
and competitive,” “[competition] between them is inevitable, but conflict is not.”22 Former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would agree with this assessment, as he has stated that the

19

Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” International
Security 23:3 (Winter 1998/1999): 124-125.
20
Victor D. Cha, “Ripe for Rivalry: Has Asia’s moment of reckoning finally arrived?” Foreign Policy, December
12, 2002, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/12/ripe_for_rivalry (accessed December 13, 2012).
21
Doug Bandow, “China’s Military Rise Means End of U.S. Hegemony?” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit:
Greenhaven Press, 2010), 133-134; Martin Malin and Hui Zhang, “US and China Must Stand Up to N. Korea,” in
China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2010), 148; Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 255; Wu 139.
22
Lee Kuan Yew, “Speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the US-ASEAN Business Council’s 25th
Anniversary Gala Dinner in Washington DC, 27 October 2009” (lecture, Washington DC, October 27, 2009)
http://www.usasean.org/Multimedia/MM_Speech.pdf (accessed Feb 16, 2013).
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“crucial competition between the United States and China is more likely to be economic and
social than military.” 23
Analyst Doug Bandow has argued that China’s military build-up is not menacing towards
the United States because China’s interests are limited to being a regional hegemon in Asia.
Therefore, the United States is capable of alleviating tensions with China if it abandons its policy
of being a military hegemon in Asia. 24 Bandow recommends that the United States should adjust
its foreign policy towards China by “reducing U.S. international ambitions rather than increasing
military spending... [and replacing] dominance with defense as the core of its foreign policy.” 25
The analysts who are more optimistic about China’s intentions and future role in the
international system argue that increased participation and success in the current international
system have caused China to learn that it can benefit from participation in the current system.26
They argue that China’s ongoing status as a responsible “no first use” nuclear power means that
it could play an important role in nuclear nonproliferation, especially in checking North Korean
aggression, nuclear weapons development and proliferation. Indeed, the relationship between
China and North Korea has seemed strained in the last few years, with Chinese leadership
recently rebuking a North Korean envoy for withdrawing from the diplomatic nuclear peace talks:
In telling the North it should return to the negotiating table, Mr. Xi appeared to
strike a stern tone, saying, “The Chinese position is very clear: no matter how the
situation changes, relevant parties should all adhere to the goal of

23

Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 525.
Bandow, 133.
25
Bandow, 134.
26
Yong Deng, “Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory,” in New
Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, 186-214 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2006): 186; Harry Harding, “China’s Co-operative Behaviour,” in Chinese Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995):
399.
24

7
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denuclearization of the peninsula, persist in safeguarding its peace and stability,
and stick to solving problems through dialogue and consultation.” 27
From this view point, China’s hesitation in increasing pressure on North Korea thus far is
due to their worries that increased American involvement in the region will exacerbate China’s
own security dilemma. Despite their obvious interests in promoting security and stability in East
Asia, “China is worried that the Korean nuclear and missile crisis will provide a pretext for
accelerating the deployment of a joint US-Japanese missile defense shield, which undermines
China’s own modest deterrent force.”28 However, even proponents of this view argue that
cooperation is still possible between the United States and China; China would need to be more
supportive of UN sanctions and exert their influence over North Korea, while the United States
would need to make it publicly clear that it has no intentions of moving its own forces to areas
along the North Korean-Chinese border.29
Other analysts take a more moderate approach – that while China is not yet powerful
enough to overthrow the current international system, it is currently in a position to cause
conflict within it. This viewpoint is most often expressed in terms of relationship between China
and North Korea. One analyst suggests that China has been driving North Korea’s menacing
stance against the United States and South Korea and points to China’s inaction in dealing with
North Korea as indicative of China’s true intentions:
China could cut off North Korea’s oil. China could shut the border to trade. Or
China could take the opposite tactic and open the border: Refugees would flee and
the regime would crumble, much as East Germany did 20 years ago… Instead, it
has maintained trade relations, kept the oil flowing, built up its border fences and

27

Jane Perlez, “China Bluntly Tells North Korea to Enter Nuclear Talks,” New York Times (May 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/25/world/asia/china-tells-north-korea-to-return-to-nucleartalks.html?partner=rss&emc=rss (accessed 05/24/2013).
28
Malin and Zhang, 148.
29
Ibid.
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paid lip service to the international efforts to block the North Korean nuclear
program […], all the while hunkering down to watch what happens. 30
She argues that China’s inaction is indicative of their ambitions to become the regional hegemon
in Asia, along with China’s increase in military spending and modernization. In this case, using
North Korea as a proxy to stymie American interests in Asia would be beneficial to China while
preventing open conflict with the United States. China’s relative inaction in restraining North
Korean aggression could also be explained by the potential of a refugee crisis if the Kim regime
is overthrown and North Korea collapses. They are concerned that “the trickle of North Koreans
currently crossing the border would turn into a flood, leaving China with a messy humanitarian
situation on its hands.”31
Domestically, China’s rise and continued economic growth have become sources of
national pride for many people, which led to the emergence of what Michel Oksenberg dubbed
as China’s “confident nationalism” 32 – a form of Chinese nationalism that specifically links
China’s rise to national survival. As such, China’s growth and recent economic success have
also been a means to domestic stability; the Chinese government is acutely aware that its own
legitimacy and relatively peaceful relationship with the masses rests on continued economic
prosperity translating into international standing and national pride. 33
The regime’s legitimacy seems to rest on three main pillars: 1) It has brought
social order after a century and a half of upheavals; 2) people’s incomes are
growing rapidly (even if the growth is unevenly distributed); and 3) Chinese enjoy

30

Anne Applebaum, “Shadow Boxing in Pyongyang,” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit: Greenhaven Press,
2010), 142.
31
Jonathan Levine, “North Korea’s Statecraft of Suicide,” The National Interest (March 8, 2013),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/north-koreas-statecraft-suicide-8197 (accessed 04/09/2013); Matt Schiavenza,
“Can China Stop North Korea?” The Atlantic (April 3, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/can-china-stop-north-korea/274626/ (accessed 04/07/2013).
32
Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Confident Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 65:3 (1987): 501-523.
33
Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 140.
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a sense that the Beijing government is restoring China to its rightful place of
prominence in the world. 34

1.2

The Confucius Institutes
The Confucius Institutes are nonprofit organizations designed “to satisfy the need of

people who are interested in Chinese learning all around the world, promoting the understanding
of Chinese language culture, enhancing the educational and cultural cooperation between China
and the world, developing the friendship between China and other countries, to help developing a
multicultural environment and building up a harmonious world.” 35 However, the Confucius
Institutes have had a mixed reception, among both their host audiences abroad and with the
domestic Chinese public. In the United States, many educational administrators have welcomed
the opportunity to host Confucius Institutes, citing the greater access to resources and the official
funding that Hanban provides. 36 Other administrators have expressed their concern over the
presence of Confucius Institutes on their campuses and the effect they would have on academic
freedom.37 Aside from overt interference in academic curriculums by the Chinese government,
some scholars and administrators are also concerned about the risk of academic self-censorship
at universities that host Confucius Institutes – that educators would be unwilling to risk to a

34

Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” in China, ed. Noah Berlatsky (Detroit: Greenhaven
Press, 2010): 37.
35
Confucius Institute Online, “About Us,” Confucius Institute Online, http://english.chinese.cn/article/201109/27/content_342613.htm (accessed February 1, 2012).
36
Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 17 (2012): 53-76;
Falk Hartig, “Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: The Case of Confucius Institutes in Australia,”
Communication, Politics & Culture 45 (2012): 256-276; Elizabeth Redden, “Confucius Says: Debate over Chinesefunded institutes at American universities,” Inside Higher Ed, Jan. 4, 2012,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities
(accessed March 12, 2012).
37
D.D. Guttenplan, “Critics Worry About the Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses,” The New York
Times, March 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-of-chinese-instituteson-uscampuses.html?_r=2&sq=Confucius%20Institute&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all (accessed March 20, 2012);
Redden.
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major source of program funding by critically examining Chinese history or government
policies. 38
Domestically, the success of the Confucius Institutes may serve as a source of national
pride. Therefore, Beijing’s support of the initiative may bolster its political legitimacy by
“restoring China to its rightful place of prominence in the world.”39 However, the current
economy may limit Chinese public support for the Confucius Institutes. Price stability has been
a major issue in China. Food prices rose over 11 percent between 2009 and 2011 and inflation
averaged at 5.53% in 2011.40 Though it lowered to 2.62% in 201241, Chinese inflation hit an
eight month high in October 2013 and food prices rose 6.5% over October 2012 levels.42 The
speed of China’s economic growth has led to this stubbornly high inflation, which has caused
CCP leadership to worry that China’s current economic growth model is “unbalanced,
uncoordinated, and unstable.” 43 Rapid economic growth has also disturbed the societal balance
in China, as the income generated has not being distributed evenly – it has widened both the
poverty gap among individuals and the economic gap geographically, especially between the
richer coastal provinces and the inland territories. 44 Meanwhile, there are Confucius Institutes in
over 300 colleges in over 90 countries, with about 70 of those branches being in the United

38

Jocelyn Chey, “The Gentle Dragon: China’s ‘charm offensive,’ through Confucius Institutes, wins allies around
the globe,” YaleGlobal Online, November 29, 2007, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/gentle-dragon (accessed
September 28, 2013); Guttenplan; Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China”; Hartig, “Cultural Diplomacy
with Chinese Characteristics: The Case of Confucius Institutes in Australia”; Redden.
39
Rowen, 37.
40
“Historic Inflation China – historic CPI inflation China,” inflation.eu, http://www.inflation.eu/inflationrates/china/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-china.aspx (accessed November 22, 2013).
41
Ibid.
42
Xiaoyi Shao and Kevin Yao, “China inflation hits eight-month high amid tightening fear,” Reuters, November 9,
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/09/us-china-economy-cpi-idUSBRE9A801X20131109 (accessed
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States.45 Hanban spends a large amount of money providing educational materials and direct
funding – some estimates ranging from $100,000 to $150,000 – to each of these institutions on a
yearly basis. 46 Given the economic situation, and the fact that reportedly as many as 400 million
people in China are unable to speak Mandarin47, the Chinese public may feel that governmental
financial support would be better spent on domestic, rather than international, programs.
In addition to this conflict of economic interests, the public may also be confused by the
current official support of the Confucius Institute, which promotes Confucius as a representative
of traditional Chinese culture. Since the fall of the Qing Dynasty, there have been numerous
iconoclastic political campaigns vilifying Confucian philosophy. Recent governmental actions
that have promoted Confucius as a prestigious figure and embraced him as a symbol of
traditional Chinese history may have been largely misunderstood by the Chinese public. 48
Much of the discourse on the Confucius Institutes tends to be heavily biased and focuses
on narrow aspects of the program, depending on the sources’ point of view. The concerns of
administrators involved with the program at universities that house the Confucius Institutes may
be more related to long-term issues like the program’s finance or sustainability. Teaching staff
may have more day-to-day concerns involving “relations with the Chinese partner university.”49
Observers not directly involved with the Confucius Institutes, such as policymakers or pundits,
tend to raise concerns of more political nature. Expressing concern over having these
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government-funded institutes on university campuses, their criticism ranges from maintaining
academic freedom to enabling Chinese governmental espionage:
The issue of academic interference was raised in Sweden in March 2008 when
some staff at Stockholm University, host to the Nordic Confucius Institute,
demanded an end to the current arrangement and the separation of the CI from the
university. The argument was framed in terms of academic freedom: that the
Chinese Embassy in Stockholm was using the Confucius Institute to carry out
political surveillance, covert propaganda and inhibit research on sensitive areas
such as the Falungong. The CI project coordinator refuted absolutely these
suggestions. 50
This wide range of concerns and biases has both academic and political implications. The
discourse impacts whether university administrators will initiate plans to house Confucius
Institutes or maintain the ones that are already on their campuses. Policy is not created in a
vacuum: academic literature regarding the Confucius Institutes may also impact whether
policymakers will pursue policies that are friendly to the program or erect barriers against it. A
comprehensive study of the Confucius Institutes that both examines the program’s structural
design and functionality and evaluates the existing literature regarding the program is necessary.

1.3

Summary
This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Confucius Institutes by

surveying the various controversies – both internationally and within China – on the rise of
China and the establishment and support of the Confucius Institutes. Chapter two will explore
the debate on China’s rise from various academic disciplines. It will begin with an overview of
how China’s rise has been perceived, both by international observers and domestically by the
Chinese population. It will then review the theories that tend to be used in scholarship to frame
China’s rise – specifically focusing on the realist, liberalist, and constructivist schools in
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international relations, Joseph Nye’s theory on soft power, and various typographies of
nationalism. Chapter two will conclude with a discussion on how the various theories interplay
to frame the debate on China’s rise.
Chapter three will begin by detailing the history of the Confucius Institutes. It will then
explore how the Confucius Institutes have been received by the Chinese public domestically,
including discussions on the rehabilitation of Confucius as a national figure, the Confucius
Institutes as symbolic of China’s rise and a source of national prestige, and Chinese
governmental and financial support for the Confucius Institutes. Chapter three will conclude
with discussion on the procedures to establishing Confucius Institutes internationally,
particularly on American college campuses.
Chapter four will focus on American foreign policy towards China and how the
Confucius Institutes have been received in the United States. It will begin with a discussion on
the interplay between political legitimacy, public opinion, and mass media, and how the three
impact American policymaking. It will then analyze published articles and radio and television
news segments to determine the extent to which American mass media has covered the
Confucius Institutes and how the controversies surrounding the Confucius Institute – particularly
the roles it plays in increasing Chinese soft power and potentially limiting academic freedom on
American college campuses – are framed.
This thesis will conclude with a discussion on Chinese grand strategy, the government’s
objectives for this project, their use of public diplomacy and their success at enhancing Chinese
soft power. It will also show how the Confucius Institutes have affected their host institutions
and communities. Finally, it will discuss the validity of the prominent criticisms of Confucius
Institutes being hosted at American universities.
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The rapid rise of China has been the subject of vigorous debate among international
relations and Asia scholars. The debate reached a high point when Foreign Affairs published
Richard Bernstein’s and Ross H. Munro’s “The Coming Conflict With America” – an article that
argued that China, “[driven] by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of
the past, and the simple urge for international power,” is taking steps to replace the United States
as the hegemonic power in Asia.1 Since then, analysts have disputed many facets of China’s rise,
including their current and future capabilities and their foreign affairs grand strategy. The
literature covers a range of theories, which include nationalism, realism, liberalism,
constructivism, and the concept of soft power. Cognizance of how these studies on China’s rise
are theoretically grounded is of practical importance because these academic studies are not
produced in a vacuum: they have very real and important consequences for how state decisionmakers construct and implement political policy. Scholars should “understand – and work
through – how conclusions and recommendations might translate into policy and think about
how the various meanings that could be assigned to such conclusions, recommendations, and
policies.”2
This chapter will provide an overview of the theories that ground the available literature
on China’s rise. It will outline the dominant and relevant theories and approaches that have been
used to discuss China’s rise, including various international relations schools of thought, and

1

Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs 76:2 (Mar/Apr
1997): 19.
2
Cecelia Lynch, “Critical Interpretation and Interwar Peace Movements: Challenging Dominant Narratives,” in
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Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, and nationalism. The chapter will conclude with a
discussion on how these theories frame scholarship on China’s rise.

2.1

International Relations Theories

Realist Perspective
Realist theory in international relations is primarily focused on power. It assumes that
the cause of conflict in the international system is the environment, which is characterized by
anarchy. 3 When there is no worldwide government to dictate or measure the behavior of states,
power is paramount. Classical realists tend to think of power as the ends in itself, while
structural realists focus on power as the means to gain security. As a result, international
relations realists generally place the importance of personal morality, utopianism, or cooperation
below either power or security. Hans Morgenthau, a classical realist, declared that
“[international politics], like all politics, is a struggle for power.”4 Due to the inherent selfish
nature of human beings and anarchy in the international system, states will ultimately define
their interests in terms of power. Morgenthau critiqued liberal theory, arguing that abstract
ideals cannot change the realities of power interests and that state morality is not comparable to
individual morality. 5
John Mearsheimer, a proponent of offensive structural realism, based his international
relations philosophy on the assumption that powerful states prefer offense because hegemony is
their ultimate goal. 6 Unlike Morgenthau, human nature was not considered in Mearsheimer’s
political outlook. Rather, due to the nature of anarchy in the international system, and the fact
3
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that the true intentions of states can never be known by other states, the only way for a state to
achieve its primary goal – assurance of its own survival – is for that state to eliminate its relative
competition by becoming a hegemon. 7 States would only have an interest in the global
promotion of democracy and protection of natural rights if it were a means to gaining security; if
those goals conflict with the state’s security, they would be discarded by policymakers. 8
The “security dilemma” is a concept in international relations theory that explains how
tensions can spiral between countries. In the classic security dilemma, the actions taken by one
state to assure its own security tend to threaten the security of other states. 9 The responses of
those other states then threaten the security of the first state as well, and could possibly spiral
into an unintended international conflict. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz and Robert
Jervis have argued that security dilemmas exist due to the existence of anarchy in the system and
the fact that states must rely on themselves for their own security. “Because some states may at
any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily
more vigorous neighbors.”10
Robert Jervis explored the nature of security dilemmas and the conditions under which
states will pursue compatible security policies and posited that the two main variables that
determine the types of security policies pursued by states are the offense-defense balance and
whether weapons and security policies can be distinguished between offensive and defense. 11
The answers to these questions will ultimately determine which of four possible worlds are
applicable to the current situation between two states – which, Jervis argued, will be highly
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indicative of the likelihood of conflict between those two states. He summed up the offensedefense balance as whether it is easier for one state to maintain its own security by attacking
their opponents rather than by defending their own borders.12 He argued that determining where
the offense-defense balance lies is necessary because a scenario in which offense is either
cheaper or easier will naturally lead to more aggression and conflict among states. 13 In defensedominated scenarios, however, “not only will the security dilemma cease to inhibit status quo
states from cooperating, but aggression will be next to impossible, thus rendering international
anarchy relatively unimportant.”14
Jervis also argued that it is important to determine whether weapons and policies
employed by a state can be distinguished as offensive or defensive, because when they are
distinguishable, much of the tension created by the security dilemma will be ameliorated. 15 The
difficulty in distinguishing between the two lies in determining intent; Jervis argued that “the
only way to discover whether arms are intended for purely defensive purposes or are held in a
spirit of aggression is in all cases to inquire into the intentions of the country concerned.”16
However, determining the intentions of a country is very difficult; although domestic politics
tend to drive foreign policy, rhetoric can be deceptive and the foreign policy intentions of a
country are never truly known by anyone but the leaders of that country. Lacking the ability to
know exactly what another country’s intentions are, countries determine other countries’
postures by examining the weapons and policies employed by those countries. Some weapons,
such as fortifications, are limited by their lack of mobility, and as such, would be used mostly for
defensive purposes. Conversely, while situations may exist where mobile, offensive weaponry
12
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would be used by states for defense or deterrence, weapons that “are particularly effective in
reducing fortifications and barriers” or “depend for their effectiveness on surprise” favor the
offensive. 17
Jervis concluded that the combination of the above factors determine where cases will
fall in four different scenarios involving the security dilemma. The most volatile of scenarios
(Jervis’ “First World”) would be where offense has the advantage and it is difficult to determine
whether a country’s posture is offensive or defensive – in these cases, arms races are likely, and
states would be more likely to pursue offensive strategies to achieve quick and decisive
victories. 18 The most stable of scenarios (or “Fourth World”) would be where defense has the
advantage and countries are able to determine whether another country’s posture is offensive or
defensive because there would not be “a reason for a status quo power to be tempted to procure
offensive forces, and aggressors give notice of their intentions.” 19 Unfortunately, the prevalence
of misperception makes the most stable of scenarios highly unlikely. The scenario where offense
has the advantage but posture is distinguishable (“Third World”) provides some stability because
states can openly pursue defensive weaponry. However, this scenario still has the risk of conflict
because defense is less desirable and more costly. The “Second World,” as Jervis described it, is
actually the scenario most commonly found in history. In this scenario, defense has the
advantage, but posture is not distinguishable. Although states can never be sure of the intentions
of other states, the fact that defense has the advantage makes conquest and aggression less likely.
In these scenarios, Jervis argued that “empathy and skillful statesmanship can reduce [the]
danger” caused by uncertainty of posture.20 In sum, a scenario where offensive has the
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advantage and intent is uncertain would lead to more volatility and be more likely to erupt into
violence than a scenario where the primary actors are more focused on defense and are fully
aware of each other’s intentions.
How policymakers envision intentions and interpret the above scenarios also has
significant implications on the nature of the foreign policy they will ultimately choose. In his
article “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” Jervis discusses how the
application of the deterrence model or the spiral model is determined by how a state perceives
the intentions of his adversary. In the deterrence model, a state would be wary to give
concessions easily to avoid sending the message to aggressive adversaries that the state is weak –
instead, they would prefer to make it clear to their adversaries that, if necessary, they are ready
and willing to engage in war in order to preserve their security. The spiral model is essentially
the misapplication of the deterrence model by one state against another state that they incorrectly
perceive to be aggressive – the increase in the first state’s security diminishes the security of the
second. In the spiral model, the security dilemmas, such as arms races, are unintended – “states
often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing
about the mutually desired situation.” 21 The problem, as Jervis describes it, is that states must
“learn to approach issues from a problem-solving perspective rather than from a competitive one”
and “work together to further and develop their common interests.” 22 Otherwise, countries risk
engaging in unnecessary and costly wars based on false premises and misperceptions.
Liberal Perspective
Liberal theory in international relations is founded in the works of John Locke and
Jeremy Bentham. Unlike realists, who assume human nature to be inherently selfish and evil,
21
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Locke rationalizes that humans are cooperative by nature because they have the capacity for
reason and that the state of war is the result of aggressive actors intervening to take advantage of
human society. Despite Locke’s high level of moral idealism, he is frequently viewed as a
liberal bridge to realist theory – he believes that while peace exists, it would be a “troubled peace”
hampered by “inconveniences,” such as the general ignorance and partiality of human beings,
and how the actions to combat aggression are constrained by weakness and fear. 23 Bentham
addresses these inconveniences by advocating for participation in international organizations
because cooperation among countries would be essential in campaigns to combat ignorance,
partiality, and fear in order to protect Lockean natural rights. 24
Immanuel Kant is frequently described as one of the most influential classical liberal
thinkers. Although more famously known for his contributions to moral philosophy and the
categorical imperative, in his article “Perpetual peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Kant outlines
three conditions (or “definitive articles,” as he refers to them) necessary in order to achieve peace
among states – (1) the first presence of a republican states that (2) form a voluntary federation
and (3) act with “universal hospitality.”25 Prior to that, Kant offers preliminary articles, which
Doyle describes as being “designed to build the mutual confidence and respect that establishing a
true peace will require.”26 If mutual confidence exists, then cooperation between states –
especially through international institutions like the United Nations, which is a primary
component of liberal international relations theory – can take place.
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Constructivist Perspective
The constructivist perspective in international relations focuses on how actors perceive
themselves and others, and how these perceptions define the interests of these actors. It operates
on two basic tenets: “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by
shared ideas rather than material forces and…that the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideals rather than given by nature.” 27 The realist school in
international relations theory tends to view anarchy in the international system as a given
condition and the primary cause of conflict, since the absence of an overarching power leads to
competition between actors in the system. The liberal school in international relations theory
views information and learning as the potential cause for cooperation between states. Therefore,
proponents of liberalism tend to promote international institutions to facilitate the sharing of
information between actors.

Constructivism differs from realism and liberalism in that it views

social interaction, identity and interests as endogenous to the causality in the theory.
Under constructivism, the predictions of both realist and liberal international relations
theory can occur without the causality provided by those two theories: conflict or cooperation
between actors depend on how those actors have defined themselves. Conflict may exist
between two actors, not for the deterministic reason of anarchy in the international system
leading to competition, but because the two actors have defined their interests in a zero-sum
manner. States may cooperate with each other, not because they believe cooperation maximizes
their own prosperity or security, but because they have positively identified with one another so
that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all.
Some scholars have criticized the utopian nature of constructivism and its usefulness as
an international relations theory. Some scholars have argued that constructivist theory, much
27
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like realist theory, relies too much on the assumption of a unitary state – a criticism to which
Alexander Wendt, one of constructivism’s main proponents, concedes. 28 However, Wendt and
other constructivists maintain that realist and liberal institutionalist theories are flawed in their
overreliance on structural arguments.
Examples oft cited by constructivists include anti-militarism displayed in Germany and
Japan following World War II.29 After the massive disarmaments at the end of the war, many
skeptics pointed to certain checkpoints, such as the economic and/or political recovery of either
country, which would bring about the remilitarization of both countries. However, despite the
economic and political recovery of both countries, both Germany and Japan remained largely
anti-militaristic. The realist explanation for the continuation of anti-militarism is that both
countries responded to their primary interest, security in the international system, by
“bandwagoning”30 or forming close ties with the United States. However, realist theory loses its
explanatory power after the fall of the Soviet Union, when America’s primary competitor was
removed from the international system, potentially making the United States less interested in
guaranteeing German and Japanese security, but both countries still failed to remilitarize. The
liberal explanation for continued German and Japanese anti-militarism is that the international
institutions established at Breton Woods at the end of World War II have allowed Germany and
Japan to learn to cooperate with other countries and not resort to remilitarization. Though liberal
theory has explanatory power over the cases of Germany and Japan, it fails to explain why other
countries that participate in liberal institutions, such as the United States, Britain and France, are
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not equally anti-militaristic. Constructivism covers these theoretical gaps by arguing that the
trauma of WWII showed that militarism was not a preferable strategy and led to a redefinition of
identity and interests for both countries. Thus, constructivist theorists would argue that the antimilitarism of Germany and Japan following World War II is better explained by focusing on
their process of defining interests rather than the structure of how those interests are defined.

2.2

Soft Power
When “power” is referred to in international relations, it means one state having the

ability to change the behavior of other states in order to get what it wants. Most international
relations realists refer to power in the direct sense – that power is exercised or commanded by
states directly over other states. This direct power can take a hard or soft form. An example of a
hard form of direct power would be one state changing the behavior of another state by directly
threatening them with their large military. An example of a soft form of direct power would be
one state changing the behavior of another state by enticing them with aid packages or loans.
However, “soft power,” a term originally coined by Joseph Nye in his book Bound to
Lead, is different from direct forms of power because it is exercised indirectly over states:
The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power
resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be
thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually
associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength. 31
To utilize soft power, it is not necessary for states to act directly with other states in order to
change their behavior – “[a] country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics
because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such
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effects.”32 In other words, soft power not only has the capacity to ultimately change a state’s
behavior, but their preferences and interests as well. Nye refers to this as “co-optive” power,
because it “can rest on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in
a way that shapes the preferences that others express.” 33
More than a decade later, Nye expanded on the concept of soft power in Soft Power: the
Means to Success in World Politics and how soft power “uses a different type of currency (not
force, not money) to engender cooperation – an attraction to shared values and the justness and
duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.”34 In Soft Power, Nye criticized recent
American foreign policy for paying too much attention to hard or direct power. Instead, he
argues, American foreign policy should look to co-opt people rather than coerce them – that
“…it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force
them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions.”35 Nye argued that this
should not be a foreign concept to American policymakers, because it frequently occurs in the
domestic politics of democratic nations – democracy is essentially based in the preferences of the
majority, and the “ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets
such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are
seen as legitimate or having moral authority.” 36
According to Nye, “[the] soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
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authority).”37 Two examples of where culture acts as a source of soft power would be the United
States and Japan; American and Japanese popular culture are sometimes received by other
countries as exciting, trendy or innovative, and can contribute to a more positive overall view of
the United States or Japan in those countries. Political values and government policies can also
attract or repel, as democracy in practice is generally valued as a positive thing while “[narrow]
values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power.”38 Nye argues even
governments that do not value or practice democracy should be aware of how they use or
squander soft power because of the possible impact on their economic objectives. 39
The utility of soft power is not limited to governmental entities – corporations,
universities, international organizations, churches, and other nongovernmental groups can also
develop and wield soft power. In some cases, nongovernmental entities have a greater degree of
freedom than governments to do so:
These flexible nongovernmental organizations and networks are particularly
effective in penetrating states without regard to borders. Because they often
involve citizens who are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries,
such networks are able to focus the attention of the media and government on
their issues. They create a new type of transnational political coalitions. 40
There are occasions where the objectives of states and nongovernmental entities are not aligned.
When states cannot rely on being able to utilize nongovernmental entities as a tool or the
nongovernmental entities actually obstruct the states’ efforts, states have to be more concerned
with how they wield soft power, because they “compete for credibility not only with other
governments, but with a broad range of alternatives including news media, corporations,
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nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and networks of scientific
communities.”41
The utility and widespread applicability of the concept of soft power have been cited as
some of the theory’s major weaknesses. Yet, unlike other international relations theories that
were deemed too academic to be of pragmatic use to policymakers, the concept of soft power has
been readily adopted by many, notably by American and Chinese policymakers and pundits.
David Kearn argued that the reason that it has been accepted – because the ambiguity of the
concept makes it a useful “catch-all” phrase, especially in the media – makes the concept itself
even more ambiguous:
Furthermore, by becoming entrenched in the public lexicon of foreign affairs,
through its transformation into mainstream policy jargon, the concept has become
more vague and diluted. In fact, one could make the albeit overly simplistic
argument that soft power has been reduced to a shorthand for what historically
would be called “prudent diplomacy” or perhaps “public relations management”
in an international context.42
This is especially evident in the way soft power is viewed in China, where policymakers and
pundits largely focus on culture as the primary source of soft power; Wang Huning, the Chinese
scholar credited with China’s first article on soft power, once stated that “if a country has an
admirable culture and ideological system, other countries will tend to follow it.” 43 Whereas Nye
intended “soft power” to be sourced by political values and foreign policy in addition to culture,
the Chinese tend to use “soft power” as shorthand for “cultural diplomacy.”
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Soft power is also limited in scope and utility. For example, if soft power is meant to
condition “target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do,” 44it
would seem to require that the nation utilizing soft power and the target nations have a shared
understanding or social context.45 It relies heavily on the liberal Foucauldian assumption that
participation in institutions will construct the primary interests of nations in such a way that
international cooperation is not only possible but preferable. Due to the intangible nature of soft
power, theorists are also skeptical over whether the efficacy of soft power is comparable to hard
power or even verifiable.46 Moreover, theorists continue to debate the extent to which hard and
soft power are capable of reinforcing and/or detracting from each other. 47
The Development of Chinese Soft Power
Increasingly, there has been scholarly attention paid to the government’s increasing focus
on projecting soft power.48 In Soft Power, Nye noted the rising status of China as a state that
may be capable of effectively wielding its soft power by pointing out examples of its recent
expansion in soft power – Gao Xingjian winning China’s first Nobel Prize for literature, the
international success of Hong Kong cinema, the popularity of Yao Ming, Beijing hosting the
2008 Summer Olympics, China’s recent investment in manned space flight, and the spread of
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large expatriate Chinese communities.49 Aside from the cultural aspects of Chinese soft power,
the Chinese government has also wielded diplomatic and economic soft power by taking steps to
improve its reputation and diplomatic relations with many of its Asian developing neighbors by
combining its “peaceful rise” rhetoric with an increase in foreign aid programs, regional trade,
and participation in regional multilateral organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).50 Some analysts argue that rather than
using tactics of coercion through private, forceful diplomacy, the Chinese government has
attempted to increase their influence and power with more persuasive tactics by using a
combination of “culture, diplomacy, participation in multinational organizations, businesses’
actions abroad, and the gravitational pull of a nation’s economic strength.”51 Beijing is shifting
to a policy of attraction, hoping that the use of public diplomacy can create a positive public
opinion of China in other countries that will assist in China in its desired foreign policy.
The Confucius Institutes are a prime example of a government-sponsored organization
designed to implement China’s policy of improving public opinion abroad. Following his
official state visit to the United States in January 2011, President Hu Jintao paid a highlypublicized visit to Walter Payton College Prep, a high school in Chicago that also houses a North
American branch of the Confucius Institutes. In addition to heavily supporting the Confucius
Institutes and other similar international outreach programs, the Chinese government has also
stepped up its efforts in inviting foreign students to study in China; the Chinese government
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committed to 10,000 “Bridge Scholarships” for American students in response to the US
government’s May 2010 launch of the “100,000 Strong” initiative. 52
Skeptical analysts view China’s increase in soft power as dangerous and are suspicious of
the intentions driving Beijing’s pursuit of soft power. Shogo Suzuki argued that China’s charm
offensive towards the Third World, especially in Africa, is rooted in their desire to trade for
natural resources and other valuable commodities, as well as to “gain valuable Third World votes
in order to avoid international censure over its poor human rights record.”53 Joshua Kurlantzick
cynically argued that China’s charm offensive is largely aimed at improving its standing in Asia:
One of China’s primary goals is simply to maintain peace on its periphery. Peace
allows China’s economy to grow and provides opportunities for Chinese
companies looking for outlets. Beijing also may wish to gain bases along
Southeast Asia’s sea lanes, dominate Asia’s inland waterways, and ultimately,
gain control of the South China Sea. Beijing also wants to reduce Taiwan and
Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia, pushing them out of regional diplomacy;
since 1994, Beijing has pursued a policy it calls “[using] all economic and
diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan.”…
Finally, Beijing may want to shift influence in Southeast Asia away from
Washington.54
Implicit in Kurlantzick’s viewpoint is the assumption that China is a revisionist state that may be
seeking soft power in order to “remake the world” 55 – that the pursuit of soft power may simply
be a transparent ploy to shore up its own security, achieve reunification, and diminish US
hegemony in East Asia. Seizing this idea as proof of a possible Chinese threat, many theorists in
US-foreign-policy think tanks have already begun developing strategies to protect American core
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interests while “Beijing [tries] to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the
resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan.” 56
Other analysts argue that the perception of a dramatic increase in Chinese soft power
coinciding with a steep decline in American soft power is premature and exaggerated.
“Although Chinese soft power is much stronger in Southeast Asia than in East Asia, China has a
long way to go in obtaining the level of soft power that the United States historically and
currently enjoys.”57 While there is some evidence to indicate that China has had some global
success in their “charm offensive,” they have also been relatively less successful in promoting a
positive image in the United States.58 As such, China has faced “serious constraints in
translating [its soft power] into desired foreign-policy outcomes.”59 Nye noted that the difficulty
in using culture and narrative to create soft power that are inconsistent with domestic realities
may be the reason China is seeing limited returns on its efforts to increase soft power:
The 2008 Olympics were a success, but shortly afterwards, China’s domestic
crackdown in Tibet and Xianjiang, and on human rights activists, undercut its soft
power gains. The Shanghai Expo was also a great success, but was followed by
the jailing of the Nobel peace laureate Liu Xiaobo and the artist Ai Weiwei. And
for all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors
for CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle
propaganda.60
If China wanted to make major gains in soft power among Western liberal democracies, Holyk
argues that it would need to move “beyond the general promotion of Chinese culture, diplomatic
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neutrality, and no-strings-attached foreign aid” to developing countries and focus on boosting its
attractiveness in the “areas of political and diplomatic soft power.”61

2.3

Domestic Perception of China’s Rise

Typologies of Nationalism
Despite a large amount of scholarly research over the last few decades, it continues to be
difficult to provide a generally agreed upon definition of the nation and nationalism. The
definitions used in contemporary scholarship tend to be modern in that they view nationalism as
a social construct rather than as primordial. However, these definitions range from objectivist to
subjectivist, instrumentalist to non-instrumentalist, civic to ethnic. Understanding how
nationalism is defined is important because definitions are assigned with some kind of value and
relevant scholarship, embedded with these implications and assumptions of value, may
significantly impact policymaking.
Objectivist definitions tend to frame nations geographically and linguistically. In “The
Nation,” Joseph Stalin offers a modern, yet largely objective definition, arguing that the nation is
“a historically constituted community of people,”62 with a common territory, administration,
economy, and language that has, over time, led to a common psychological make-up or culture.
Subjectivist definitions, such as the seminal one provided by philosopher Ernest Renan, are not
limited to common objectifiers like language; they tend to require an implicit understanding of
shared identity and a sense of belonging by the people who constitute the nation:
To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have
accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential
condition for being a nation… A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the
61
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sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make
again. 63
Another important method for classifying definitions of nationalism is whether they are
instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist. Instrumentalist scholars, such as Hugh Seton-Watson,
Eric Hobsbawm, and Anthony Smith, and Ernest Gellner, tend to view nationalism as a political
tool used by societal elites. Seton-Watson argued that societal elites tend to utilize some
combination of “state power, religion, language, social discontents and economic pressures”
during nationalist movements in order to form and articulate a burgeoning national
consciousness. 64 Hobsbawm notably argued that political elites engage in “social engineering” 65
for the purposes of gaining legitimacy and consolidating power by “inventing traditions”66 and
using primary education, public ceremonies, and public monuments as symbols in their favored
narrative on the nation’s history, trials and aspirations. 67 Smith provided a clear instrumentalist
definition of nationalism, stating it to be “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to
constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’” 68
Ernest Gellner, one of the greatest contributors to scholarship on nationalism, argued that
societies naturally produce nationalism as they modernize. 69 Since the bureaucracies of
modernizing societies require a common language and a certain level of literacy in order to
support industrialization, they institute centralized public education systems, which leads to the
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creation and dissemination of a shared high culture with a codified written and verbal language. 70
Language and the education system are essential, because their ability to unify is what ultimately
distinguishes national loyalty from loyalty to other smaller units, such as towns, tribes or clans:
“modern loyalties are centred on political units whose boundaries are defined by the language (in
the wider or in the literal sense) of an education system […] and that when these boundaries are
made rather than given, they must be large enough to create a unit capable of sustaining an
educational system.”71 The irony, as Gellner described it, is that romantic ideals embedded in
nationalism frequently serve utilitarian ends: nationalism has the tendency to use symbolism
“drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants” when it is actually “the general
imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of
the majority” by an excluded elite or intelligentsia as a means to engender mass loyalty. 72
Non-instrumentalists focus less on the role of nationalism as a political tool, possibly by
focusing more on national identities and the process by which national consciousness comes into
being. Benedict Anderson, in his seminal work on nationalism, Imagined Communities, took a
historical approach to explain nationalism as a relatively modern phenomenon by tracing how it
originated and spread through language or literacy, religion, the decline of kingship, and
colonialism. In that sense, Anderson’s definition of the nation is derivative of Gellner’s,
especially with the focus on nationalism being a relatively modern phenomenon driven by
language and literacy. Many nationalist scholars use history as the framework for the evolution
of nationalism, arguing that the development of national consciousness and rise of nationalist
movements were driven by the systemic changes caused by the Enlightenment, the Industrial

70

Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization,” 59.
Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization,” 59.
72
Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism and High Cultures,” in Nationalism, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1994, 65.
71

34

Chapter Two: Theories on China’s Rise

Revolution, the Reformation, capitalism, and other significant historical events. Though he
discussed how history progressed – how religion and religious communities used sacred texts
and language to tie the community together, how societal coherence shifted away from
religiously organized systems to systems based on kingship, then how the Enlightenment
diminished the authority and legitimacy of kings – Anderson was unique in his approach,
stressing that the evolution of nationalism should not be thought of as “simply growing out of
and replacing religious communities and dynastic realms. 73 In actuality, it was possible for
nationalism to develop because there was a fundamental change in the way people perceived the
world and time. People began to change in how they understood time, viewing it as simultaneity
of past and future in an instantaneous present.”74
However, Anderson’s definition was subjective, as he defined the nation as “imagined”
due to the spread of print capitalism. 75 Anderson’s study, inspired by the tomb of Unknown
Soldiers as a monument to national identity and a symbol of what one is willing to fight and die
for, was also less instrumentalist. He noted that many political ideologies, specifically Marxism
and Liberalism, which are not generally concerned with concepts like fatality and immortality,
fail to adequately explain the nationalist phenomena present in the tomb of Unknown Soldiers. 76
Therefore, in this sense, nationalist fervor, as symbolized through the tomb of Unknown Soldiers,
is more similar to religious fervor than ideological or political.
Anderson’s concept of a nation is subjectivist and less instrumentalist because it involves
how the concept of the nation is shared by members of the community and how they are
understood through the experience of each individual. In addition to the change in how people
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understood time, another development that particularly shaped the advent of nationalism, was the
technological development of print-capitalism. 77 Once people began having regular access to the
newspaper, they were able to read about and sympathize with the plights of people. They began
to imagine themselves as part of a community with the people that they were reading about in
their newspapers. In short, Anderson argued that the nation is imagined simultaneously by its
members in its boundaries and its membership, and the creation of the nation was possibly only
when men were able to look past certain historical cultural assumptions – on particular languages
or religious communities having a monopoly on truth, the natural order of monarchs, and the
way time was conceived.
Anderson’s critics may argue that his concept of nationalism relies too heavily on the
subjectivist approach – that there are tangible characteristics and trends that can objectively be
noticed in nationalist movements. According to these critics, “an adequate account of such
modern social forms as nationalism must capture the dynamic interplay between sociohistorical
processes and the embodied, constituting character of everyday practices and cultural categories
of understanding.”78 While Anderson tried to close that gap in Imagined Communities, Goswami
argued that his attempt was undermined by his methodology – “[by] conceptualizing modularity
as a universal process of mimesis (of self-identical repetition through time and across space)
rather than a historically constituted systemic dimension of the modern nation form.” 79
Goswami argued that trying to bridge this gap between subjectivist and objectivist is especially
important because of the implications it has for the future of nationalist studies in the context of
globalization. “The apparent erosion of the territorial correspondence between culture, territory,
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people, and economy has imposed, according to this view, novel constraints on territorial
sovereignty and the inherited nation-state project of homogenization. How to think through the
spread of nationalism, in tandem with global capitalism, remains both conceptually difficulty and
politically urgent.”80 Goswami argued that her approach “[provides] analytical leverage and
comparative perspective on the present”81 by “[emphasizing] the possibility of reconstitution
based upon a historically constituted range of possibilities and the contradictory spatio-temporal
dynamic of capitalism.”82
However, there are not many scholarly works currently available, especially regarding
Chinese nationalism, that take this dualist approach. Therefore, another important concept to
consider given the abundance of objectivist approaches to case studies in nationalism is the
common distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. In civic definitions of nationalism,
notions of national unity are to be viewed positively by members – this tends to lead civic
nationalism to be characterized as individualistic, liberal, inclusive and universal. If individuals
choose to adopt the principles of a nation and participate as citizens, then they are accepted as
citizens regardless of their birthplace or ethnicity. Conversely, membership tends to not be
viewed positively in cases of ethnic nationalism, as ethnicity, and thus, membership, is not
chosen by individuals but ascribed to them. As a result, cases of ethnic nationalism are generally
characterized as being collectivistic, illiberal, exclusive and particular. The values assigned to
examples of nationalism and automatically assumed on the basis of their classification become
especially evident in the civic versus ethnic distinction – scholars who use this distinction also
frequently note that civic nations tend to be democratic and developed while ethnic nations tend
to be authoritarian and have greater issues with development.
80
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While it is unusual for scholars to define nationalism exclusively on civic or ethnic terms,
many tend to sway towards the ethnic. Though Renan’s focus was on the existence of solidarity
and not necessarily how that solidarity was qualified, there was an implied ethnic slant in his
definition of a nation – that the nation was constituted by a shared past and “the actual consent,
the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common.”83
Max Weber concedes that nations “need not be based upon common blood,” he stresses that “the
idea of the ‘nation’ is apt to include the notions of common descent and of an essential, though
frequently indefinite, homogeneity.” 84 However, as states and their political systems evolve, so
too may the nature of nationalism. Clifford Geertz argued that while “primordial ties,” such as
kinship, language or culture may fuel some many nationalist movements, “[to] an increasing
degree national unity is maintained not by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent,
and routing allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental
use of police powers and ideological exhortation.”85
Hans Kohn’s work is sometimes perceived as overlapping with theory that distinguishes
between civic and ethnic nationalism, with some scholars arguing that he simply applied a
geographical space to the same concept.86 Kohn distinguished the Western versus Eastern forms
of nationalism, specifically comparing Western European and Central or Eastern European
countries. Kohn argued that the difference between Western and Eastern concepts of nationalism
is caused by how two major cultural and religious movements, the Renaissance and the
Reformation, were interpreted in those regions. In Western countries, Kohn argued that those
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movements had a much greater impact and actually created new societies. However, in Germany
and other Central and Eastern European countries, the Renaissance and the Reformation were
largely viewed as mere “scholarly or theological events” 87. According to Kohn, the difference
between the two forms of nationalism is that the Western form emerged “in an effort to build a
nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without too much sentimental
regard for the past” while other forms of nationalism emerged “out of the myths of the past,
devoid of any immediate connection with the present and expected to become a political
reality.”88
Rogers Brubaker argued that the entire civic-ethnic distinction “overburdened” 89 because
the terms are too ambiguous and lead to confusion. A narrow understanding of either “civic” or
“ethnic” will leave the other too large and heterogeneous to be meaningful as a classifier, and a
broad understanding of both would mean that the two terms are no longer mutually exclusive. 90
He also disputed the notion that civic nationhood is more inclusive than ethnic, stating that they
were “differently inclusive (and exclusive).” 91 Furthermore, he argues that the ethnic-civic
distinction unfairly leads to implications on countries’ ability to adapt to change and whether
development is possible without also changing identities. 92 Brubaker suggests that a more
meaningful way of analyzing and classifying nationalism while reducing ambiguity would be to
have the state as the “cardinal point of reference” instead of citizenship. Therefore, nationalism
should be categorized as “state-framed” or “counter-state” instead of “civic” or “ethnic.” 93
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As discussed above, the definitions of nationalism used in contemporary scholarship
range from objectivist to subjectivist, instrumentalist to non-instrumentalist, civic to ethnic. The
distinctions between the definitions matter because implicit values are assigned to those
definitions. For example, if a particular nationalism is perceived as subjective or civic, then
nationalism is not assigned at birth; in other words, the national chooses to belong and remain
with the nation and the nationalism of individuals can less easily be classified by where they
were born. If policymakers perceive a nationalism to be non-instrumentalist, then they are less
likely to fear that nationalism will translate into that country’s official policy. However, if
policymakers perceive a country’s nationalism to be objectivist, instrumentalist, and ethnic, they
may feel threatened and formulate combative policies against that country. In this case,
nationalist sentiment would be ascribed to a group of people by virtue of shared geography and
language, making it more immutable. Furthermore, this nationalist sentiment could be subject to
elite predation, as it could be wielded by the government as a political tool for popular
mobilization.

Chinese Nationalism
In much of the literature on Chinese nationalism, especially as it concerns Chinese
foreign policy, Chinese nationalism tends to be framed as Eastern and/or ethnic. However, even
within this framework, Chinese nationalism takes on a multitude of characteristics. In his study
on the development of Chinese nationalism in the late 20th century, Michel Oksenberg provided a
useful framework for categorizing Chinese nationalism: (1) “self-pitying, self-righteous, and
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aggrieved;” (2) “strident, xenophobic, and isolationist;” (3) “militant, rigid, assertive, and
occasionally muscular;” and (4) “confident.”94
The first form of nationalism can simultaneously display admiration and a deep mistrust
of the outside world; it is also characterized by public hypersensitivity to perceived offenses and
the tendency “to claim that the outside world owes China a debt” due to the century of
humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers.95 The second form of nationalism is embodied by
values of self-reliance. As displayed in movements such as the Boxer Rebellion and Cultural
Revolution, this form of nationalism attributes Chinese national weakness to a “loss of
ideological purity” due to foreign influences in China during the century of humiliation, and thus
argues that “national salvation must be attained through exclusive reliance upon indigenous
virtue, strength, and ideas.” 96 The third type – militant, rigid, assertive and occasionally
muscular nationalism – tends to “attribute Chinese weakness to external economic exploitation
and cultural infiltration but recognize the useful role of the outside world, particularly its
technology, in their quest for modernity.” 97 Thus, this type of Chinese nationalism tends to
manifest in irredentist disputes of national sovereignty, such as Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands and
the South China Sea. The last type, confident nationalism, focuses on steady growth as the
means to addressing Chinese national weakness. This form, which has largely developed
following Deng Xiaoping’s regime, is based on the strategy of modernization and the
importation of technology to ensure national survival. 98
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2.4

Summary
While examples of Chinese nationalism tend to display many of the characteristics

outlined in Oksenberg’s framework, much of the Western literature itself on Chinese nationalism
tends to be ethnic and instrumentalist. Samuel Huntington claimed that the Chinese
government’s use of nationalist rhetoric is an example of China “[acting] in classic fashion as a
regional hegemon…[and] attempting to minimize obstacles to its achievement of regional
military superiority.”99 He also implicitly labels Chinese nationalism as a form of ethnic
nationalism, stating that “Chinese identity, subject to so many onslaughts from the West in the
twentieth century, is now being reformulated in terms of the continuing elements of Chinese
culture”100 – which he later compares to Wilhelmine Germany, immediately conjuring images of
a closed society and widely perceived in the West as a negative phenomenon. 101 Given the
comparisons to pre-WWI Germany and the blend of self-pitying, aggrieved, isolationist, and
muscular nationalism alluded to by Huntington, the realist implication for American foreign
policy is that Chinese nationalism has become a threat that the United States cannot ignore and
the United States must work towards preventing Chinese regional hegemony.
Analysts holding this viewpoint also tend to be instrumentalist. Many of the earlier
studies in Chinese nationalism following the Chinese Civil War suggested that nationalism is
merely a tool utilized by the Chinese Communist Party to bolster popular support for its regime
by inciting anger against other nations and assumed that the CCP invented nationalist myths or
shaped Chinese identity to consolidate power.102 Michael Ng-Quinn argued that “[through] the
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manipulation of ideologies and other symbols, the Chinese elite selectively and dynamically
moderated or intensified nationalism to secure domestic support for various national roles, a role
being understood as identity mobilized in a specific situation.” 103 Willy Wo-Lap Lam concurred,
stating that “propagating patriotism, which in many areas overlaps with nationalism or even
xenophobia, is perhaps an easy way for the leadership to promote a sense of unity and common
purpose, which will also serve to prolong the party’s mandate of heaven. Moreover, Beijing also
sees patriotism and nationalism as an antidote to the harmful and destabilizing effects of
globalization.”104 This line of reasoning, influenced by constructivist theory, also has significant
policy implications: by crafting a narrative of victimization and “making nationalism so central
to the claim to CCP legitimacy” 105 the CCP is antagonistically defining Chinese national
interests in direct opposition with those of the Western world. “The claim that only the CCP can
deliver the nation from humiliation by achieving certain goals in economic, unification and
foreign policy, is what determines the ‘culture of international anarchy’ for China in the global
era.”106
This ultimately implies that Chinese nationalism, rooted in Western antagonism, is a
threat to American interests and a possible source of conflict between the two countries.
Furthermore, despite not being fully in control of nationalist discourse, the Chinese government
has shown that it is capable of utilizing nationalist sentiment or national pride as a policy tool, as
it did with the domestic anti-American public rallies following the American bombing of the
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Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the American-Chinese spy plane collision in 2001 and the
brief boycott of French goods following President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in
2008. The perception that the government was willing and able to wield nationalism as a policy
tool further supports the “China threat” theory advocated by some foreign policymakers and
advisers, especially the United States107
There are arguments that counter the notion that Chinese nationalism will definitely lead
to conflict between the United States and China. Peter Hays Gries warned:
Realists are right – there are conflicts of material interests in U.S.-China relations
today. A common interest in a stable East Asia likely outweighs any material
conflicts, however. There more likely danger to bilateral relations lies in the
possible emergence of what Kelman called “existential conflict,” or the
development of a zero-sum identity competition on both sides of the Pacific.
Unless Chinese and Americans learn to affirm, rather than threaten, each others’
national identities, their mutual benefit from a stable East Asia will not ensure
peace in the twenty-first century.108
Jeffrey Wasserstrom argued that nationalism may not cause conflict between the US and China
because attempts to utilize nationalism for political purposes can actually backfire on the CCP:
“nationalism remains a double-edged sword, which does at times buttress the regime but can also
develop in ways that threaten the political status quo.”109 However, both arguments still view
nationalism as a tool, and do not view the evolution of Chinese nationalism as a historical
process of repeated identification.
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While there appear to be fewer proponents of liberal international relations theory than
realist theory – especially in literature concerning Chinese nationalism and Sino-American
relations – there are some liberal theorists who counter the inevitability of Chinese-American
conflict and offer suggestions for the governments of both countries to minimize the tensions
between them. Li Qingsi made a classic liberal theory recommendation:
First, the relations with the United States can be maintained as a contained
struggle without breaking out, using struggle to seek cooperation. Joseph Nye
said that if the United States takes China as its enemy, then it will be; the contrary
is also true, though China-U.S. relations is not decided mainly by the Chinese…
As long as both sides could fully appreciate the common interests in regional and
world affairs and the profound need for both parties to cooperate in those areas,
the two countries would find more benefits than costs in avoiding involving direct
confrontation and becoming adversaries, which could help to maintain a stable
and cooperative China-U.S. relationship.110
However, in arguments such as this, Chinese nationalism is still used as a tool by the government
– however, for strictly domestic purposes of achieving and maintaining national unity rather than
a means to project power, culture and values internationally.
If liberal international relations theory is to be applied, then determining Chinese foreign
policy intentions – whether China is a revisionist or status quo power – becomes very important.
One way to determine their intentions is to examine their participation in the current international
system. While there is never a high degree of certainty when evaluating the intentions of other
states, accusations on China being a rising revisionist power, nefariously using its might to gain
territorial concessions and controlling the actions of North Korea in order to achieve global
domination,111 are unconvincing. It has become fairly obvious over the last few decades that
China actively participates in international institutions. “China already belongs to some seventy
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international institutions and will likely seek a louder voice in the major ones, such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations and its associated bodies. These
groups offer China a platform from which to put forth its agenda as well as to cooperate with
other countries.”112 There may be complaints over various aspects of Chinese foreign policy,
such as their propensity to prefer protecting national sovereignty above all else and their relative
reluctance side with Western members of the permanent United Nations Security Council to
authorize humanitarian interventions, but China mostly subscribes to international norms and
standards, especially when compared to rogue states like North Korea.
Another means to determining Chinese foreign policy intentions is to examine Chinese
domestic politics. While there may be some examples of nationalism in Chinese domestic
politics that some security analysts may find threatening, especially when territorial claims with
Japan or in the South China Sea are concerned, it is often directed towards economically
strengthening and modernizing China. Therefore, though Western states should continue to
monitor Chinese domestic politics to the greatest extent possible to remain informed if
significant shifts in Chinese foreign policy intentions occur, both the West and China currently
have more to gain by being cooperative with each other rather than hostile.
There have been some attempts within academia to provide alternative discourses on
theories of Chinese nationalism. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim reluctantly dismiss the notion
of nationalism existing simply as a tool of the political elite by stating “identification with the
national essence is to some extent a variable rather than a constant.”113 Douglas Woodwell
raised the viewpoint of immigrants by discussing the stress of estrangement on immigrant
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communities and the search for national identity in the context of the need for linkages back
home. 114 However, the most impressive attempt at studying nationalism using Goswami’s
methodology would be Yingjie Guo’s study tracing the evolution of the national myth of Zeng
Guofan, the Confucian scholar and military general who raised and commanded an army for the
Qing Empire during the Taiping Rebellion. In that study, Guo concludes:
So as far as national identity is concerned, what is essential is a sense of common
history, no matter whether that history is rediscovered or invented and no matter
how garbled or mythical it may be… In a word, there is no denying that national
histories are often constructed narratives that serve clear ideological, political, and
other purposes… Moreover, the re-narration of history is in itself an act of
political empowerment: it is a demand for the right and freedom to say who ‘we’
are and who ‘we’ have been as well as the exercising of that right and freedom.
This right and freedom is important not simply because who ‘we’ think ‘we’ are is
in itself important, but also because national identity gives people a moral
perspective on the world that provides interpretations of the world and of
themselves and because national identity serves as a basis upon which a nation
decides how or how not to conduct its collective life.115
In this analysis, Guo uses both the objectivist and subjectivist approach – taking trends
into account and the stories of Zeng Guofan change in response to the historical context of the
evolution of the shared conception of the modern Chinese nation, while still maintaining the
importance of nationalism has evolved through repeated exercises in self-identification. A
similar methodology would be useful in approaching a future study concerning the Confucius
Institutes and their impact on Chinese identity through the export of Chinese language and
culture and the retelling of Chinese narratives.
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For thousands of years, the Chinese language has been used as a tool to promote national
unity. In the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP took several initiatives to promote the concept of a
unified national language:
The issue of language standardisation became a priority for the Communist
government soon after it assumed power in 1949. It moved to standardise
grammar and vocabulary, and officially adopted the term putonghua ‘common
speech’ for the national language in 1955. 1
The government has also required that putonghua be used in school and mass media. 2 The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, initially adopted in 1982 by the 5th National
People’s Congress, included language to promote putonghua nationally; since then, “[Putonghua]
was made the compulsory medium of instruction in universities” 3
The Chinese government also promotes the use of its simplified script. While there are
approximately 10 Sinitic languages with potentially thousands of dialects, there are currently
only three Chinese scripts in use worldwide:
Until the middle of the 20th century Chinese script existed in a standard form
throughout East Asia. This was ﬁrst breached by the Japanese, whose post-war
reforms included the deﬁnition of a limited standard set of Chinese characters to
be used in Japanese, the jōyō kanji, and the introduction of simpliﬁed forms, with
fewer brush strokes than standard characters. This process was taken much
further by the mainland Chinese government in the 1950s with the publication of
a series of radical simpliﬁcations of characters and elements of characters. This
has had the effect of creating three different Chinese scripts: the original version
which continues to be used in Hong Kong, Taiwan and most of the Chinese
diaspora, the mainland Chinese simpliﬁed version and the Japanese simpliﬁed
version. 4
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The Chinese government promotes its linguistic preferences for three reasons. The first
is primarily to pursue domestic stability through social unification and politics of identity. For
example, in certain regions that are heavily populated with China’s non-Han minorities, their
languages are officially recognized along with putonghua. However, the CCP has been applying
additional pressure to these regions to adopt putonghua for tertiary education. The theory behind
this logic is that the use of putonghua will diminish the overall differences between the Han
majority and the ethnic minorities. Starr describes this as “an attempt to make rebellious areas
such as Xinjiang and Tibet unequivocally Chinese, and to cater for the large number of Han
immigrants, encouraged to go there in order to change the demographic balance in these
sensitive regions.”5
The second reason is to legitimate CCP rule to international audiences. Until the
twentieth century, China was highly xenophobic and largely unwilling to teach Chinese to
foreigners; “[t]he imperial court of China had spurned engagement with the outside world as a
deliberate policy of defensive isolation.” 6 However, “[t]hroughout human history, various
languages have served as media for the transmission of cultural knowledge, assisted in the
formation of global-local power structures, and functioned as shibboleths for determining friend
from foe.”7 The CCP recognized this when it assumed power in 1949 and soon undertook
Chinese foreign language (CFL) initiatives, primarily in the socialist and so-called “Third World”
countries that the PRC had diplomatic relations with:
In 1950, in response to the request to exchange students with those from socialist
countries, beginning with Poland and the former Czechoslovakia, in Eastern
Europe, the Chinese government commissioned Tsinghua University to prepare to
5
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teach the exchange students Chinese... The first academic paper concerning CFL
– Some Issues in Teaching Chinese to Non-Chinese Students – appeared in 1952
in China. The first CFL textbook – Chinese Teaching Textbook – to be taught in
the former Soviet Union was published in 1958 by Beijing University. 8
As China adopted the Open Door Policy in the late 1970’s and throughout the 1980s,
CFL policy and determining which linguistic preferences are internationally accepted as being
“Chinese” became high priorities for the reforming CCP government. In addition to promoting
the use of putonghua and its simplified Chinese characters, the CCP also introduced its own
standard in the romanization of Chinese characters, pinyin, which has since become the world
standard (as opposed to the previous French and British methods of romanization and the zhuyin
fuhao utilized by Taiwan).9 “In [1978], the Ministry of Education ﬁrst introduced CFL degrees
at four universities: Beijing Languages University, Beijing Foreign Languages University,
Shanghai Foreign Languages University, and Huazhong Teachers University, followed by
master’s degrees; the highest level in this subject is now a doctoral degree at some universities,
featuring the academic research area of CFL curriculum, as well as implying a potential
educational market."10 When Beijing established the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) in 1984,
China’s standardized international language examinations which test Chinese proficiency for
non-native speakers using putonghua, the simplified characters, and pinyin, it further reinforced
the CCP’s linguistic preferences internationally. 11 Setting the linguistic standard for learning
Chinese abroad is one method the CCP uses to assert externally that it is the sole legitimate
representative of China and official transmitter of Chinese culture.
Finally, and most obviously, the CCP promotes its linguistic preferences in order to
facilitate China’s international trade:
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As China continues with its rapid economic development, expands its share of
world trade, and hones its diplomatic prowess, the value of the Chinese language
likewise increases. Today, Chinese is more than just the language associated with
the country’s 5,000-year civilization and oriental philosophical thought; it is also
a fast-developing commercial lingua franca in the Pacific basin. Its practical value
has surpassed that of French, German, and even Japanese in much of the world
and its future opportunities seem limitless. 12
Therefore, the Chinese government promotes its linguistic preferences in order to provide
competitive advantages to the Chinese business and trade in international markets.
This chapter will focus on the Confucius Institutes – the primary organization that the
Chinese government uses to promote its linguistic preferences internationally. It will begin by
providing a history of Confucianism in China and discussing the significance of choosing
Confucius as the organization’s namesake. It will then provide a history of the Confucius
Institutes and discuss how they have become a source of Chinese national prestige. Finally, this
chapter will outline the procedures to establishing Confucius Institutes and how the government
supports the Institutes financially and politically.

3.1

The Rise, Fall and Rehabilitation of Confucius
Confucius (551-479 B.C), one of the greatest civil officials, educators and philosophers

of his time, is widely considered to be one of the founding fathers of Chinese civilization:
He was said to have 3,000 students and 72 disciples, with whom he travelled the
vassal states in ancient China for 14 years. He collated and compiled many
ancient books, including the Book of Songs, the Book of History, the Book of
Rites, and the Book of Music. He also wrote the Spring-and-Autumn Annals, and
the preface for the Book of Changes. His thoughts and doctrines left a profound
influence on the following generations, and he is still revered today. 13
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Confucius served as “Minister for Public Works and Minister for Justice in Lu, a state in
northeastern China.14 However, he was able to have such widespread influence by serving as a
teacher to Chinese rulers. As previously mentioned, prior to the later years of the Zhou dynasty
and the Qin dynasty, Chinese society was largely feudal. “Confucianism began as a means of
bringing social order out of the chaos of a period of warring states.”15 As feudal princes
competed with each other for power and hegemony, Confucius and other scholars maintained
schools that taught these rulers principles of good conduct and proper governance, rooted in the
concept of the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate of Heaven is a concept developed during the
Zhou dynasty that stipulated that the legitimacy of Chinese rulers is determined by their conduct:
According to the classic Book of History, the wickedness of the last ruler of the
Shang, who was a tyrant, caused Heaven to give a mandate to the Chou to destroy
him and supplant his dynasty, inasmuch as the Shang people themselves had
failed to overthrow the tyrant. As later amplified, this ancient idea became the
famous ‘right of rebellion,’ the last resort of the populace against tyrannical
government. It emphasized the good conduct or virtue of the ruler as the ethical
sanction for preserving his rule. Bad conduct on his part destroyed the
sanction. Heaven withdrew its Mandate, and the people were justified in
deposing the dynasty, if they could. 16
Confucius’ teachings were rooted in the idea that the good conduct of men would bring
social harmony and harmony with nature. In other words, “man is so much a part of the natural
order that improper conduct on his part will throw the whole of nature out of joint,” so “man’s
conduct must be made to harmonize with the unseen forces of nature, lest calamity
ensue.”17 Good conduct in relationships between people was determined by two concepts: ren
and li. Ren was the ideal of humaneness or benevolence. Li referred to etiquette or rituals
14
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according to status. As a result, Confucian teachings “emphasized court etiquette, state
ceremonies, and proper conduct toward one’s ancestors and in the famous five degrees of
relationships.”18 Larus summarizes the five hierarchical and reciprocal Confucian
relationships:
The five Confucian relationships are between ruler and subject, father and son,
husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and friend and friend. For
example, a father would raise, nourish, and educate his son the son would be filial
(xiao) to his father, obeying him and giving him a commendable funeral. Note
that of the five relationships, three were kinship oriented. In traditional Chinese
society, the individual’s primary duty was to the family rather than to the state. 19
Confucianism provided the basis for both Chinese society and governance. At an
individual level, the teachings of Confucius emphasized the importance of education, selfcultivation, and self-discipline, observing public rituals and maintaining hierarchical and
properly ordered family and social relationships. 20 Maintaining hierarchical relationships clearly
served political purposes by ensuring that the Chinese public remained loyal to the Emperor, as
long as the Emperor virtuously and benevolently ruled. Over time, Confucianism was integrated
into Chinese governance:
During the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), Confucianism was adopted as the
official state ideology, and an imperial academy was founded for the cultivation
of Confucian scholars. During the Sui Dynasty (581—618 CE), this official
patronage evolved into an examination system for public office that was grounded
upon study of the Confucian classics. 21
Though Confucius’ influence was widespread throughout Chinese society, his influence
has been most evident and significant in the Chinese education system; in fact, the
aforementioned nationwide civil service examination system almost lasted until the fall of the
Qing Dynasty. "Education in China has been an outgrowth of Confucian ethics and values since
18
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Confucius established the country’s first school, ca. 521 BCE; by the time of the Qing Dynasty,
the main goal of Chinese educational institutions was to impart Confucian ethics and
values.”22 The Confucian education system established a meritocracy in Chinese
governance: for hundreds of years, “the government was staffed by scholar-officials who gained
their positions through competitive imperial examinations [and] the emperor ruled with the
Mandate of Heaven and was conscious of rites and rituals as well as the need to meet the needs
of his people.”23
Confucianism was challenged as the basis for Chinese governance and society when
China was forcibly opened to the West; China’s vulnerability to Western military power during
the First Opium War (1839-1842) and Second Opium War (1856-1860) and the resulting losses
of sovereignty led many to doubt the old Confucian order and the embattled Qing Dynasty that
had been propagating it. Leaders in the Taiping Rebellion, the civil war in southern China that
lasted from 1850 to 1864, rebelled against the Qing Dynasty and rejected Confucianism in favor
of their own form of Christianity. However, there remained Confucian elements in the Taiping
Rebellion, despite its formal rejection of Confucianism; though its leader, Hong Xiuquan,
“considered himself Christian and even destroyed Confucian temples, his creative
‘misunderstanding’ of Christianity revealed his Confucian upbringing.” 24 Though the Taiping
Rebellion was eventually crushed by the Qing Dynasty with the help of Western militaries, it
would inspire the intellectual movements that would ultimately cause the downfall of the Qing:
The radical critique of traditional culture led directly to the spawning of new
political movements, often inspired by trends in the West and Japan, to remedy
what were seen as social injustices and oppressive institutions in China. These
22
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were essentially intellectual movements, without popular support, but they had a
profound influence on members of the educated elite who became leaders of
revolutionary parties. 25
After the Taiping Rebellion, Chinese intellectuals attempted to institute a series of selfstrengthening reforms (tzu-chiang), preferring to preserve Confucian values and traditions while
learning to utilize Western technology. However, it soon became apparent that these limited
reforms were not going to have a drastic impact on China’s modernization:
The first response of Chinese intellectuals was to accept the guns, railroads, and
factories and reject the ideas – the scientific and philosophical systems – that had
given rise to them. Maintaining a ‘Chinese essence’ while borrowing ‘practical
things’ from the West was a last-ditch defensive stance against the threat of
wholesale Westernization. It was quickly overwhelmed, and Western ideas about
social and political relationships soon damaged the credibility of the Confucian
canon to the point that it could no longer serve to underpin the mounting of a new
dynasty and the restoration of the old order. Instead, restoration gave way to a
long, intensely painful process of revolution. 26
By the late 19th century, it became clear that “China was no longer a land of complacent
Confucian scholars cherishing a comfortable belief in the moral superiority of Chinese
civilization in the face of impending national disaster.”27 Chinese intellectuals began searching
for new methods to build a strong Chinese state and society that would survive and prosper –
methods that did not necessarily include preserving old Confucian traditions. By the time the
Wuchang Uprising succeeded in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in October 1911 and Yuan
Shikai, the Chinese general leading the Beiyang Army, assumed the presidency, intellectuals
were already participating in new political and philosophical movements. “Among these,
anarchist, egalitarian, and feminist movements in the early decades of the twentieth century
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contributed to the ferment and discontent that stirred the founders of the Chinese Communist
Party.”28
One of the most significant of these movements was the New Culture Movement; led by
the Chinese scholars who would become the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party,
the New Culture movement “called for a revolution against Confucianism because of its failure
to address China’s current problems and transform China into a modern society, and its
replacement with a new Chinese culture based on democracy and science." 29 “It was the climax
of a mental awakening that had begun in 1915, or in those early years following the 1911
Revolution that had overthrown the Qing dynasty but failed to establish a new social order.”30
Meanwhile, the opportunistic and corrupt Yuan Shikai had taken steps to reinstate
Confucianism as the state religion and the basis of the education system for the sole purpose of
consolidating his new power.31 He died from kidney failure in June 1916 after a brief,
abandoned attempt to restore the Chinese monarchy with himself as the emperor. Yuan’s death
resulted in a power vacuum, exacerbating the regional militarism that had already been rising
since the Opium Wars and the fall of the Qing dynasty. The ensuing era, the Warlord Era, began
in 1916 and ended in approximately 1928 with the success of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Northern
Expedition. During this period in Republican China, Confucianism became even further
removed from Chinese life, especially among intellectuals:
While republican politics floundered in a sea of warlordism and economic
dislocation, the estrangement of Chinese intellectuals from the traditional ideals
and institutions deepened. This process, which began with concessions to
Westernization by even would-be defenders of Confucianism, had reached a
climax well before the republican revolution with the abandonment of the
28
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traditional curriculum for the civil service, long the institutional stronghold of
Confucian ideology... Instead now of intellectuals serving as defenders of
tradition, they had become its most implacable critics. Thus Confucianism had
lost not only its bureaucratic function but even the basis of its intellectual life in
the school. 32
The May 4th Movement in 1919 is largely revered as the turning point in modern
Chinese history and the genesis of China’s intellectual revolution. During World War I (19141918), Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius was occupied, first by Germany then by
Japan. Though China did not contribute troops to allied forces during the war, it did provide
engineers and other workers to repair infrastructure abroad; their contribution of workers, plus
the prevailing international norms of sovereignty and self-determination, led the Chinese
government and population to believe that the international community would return control of
Shandong to China after the war. When they discovered that control of Shandong was
exchanged to Japan as a condition for its participation in the League of Nations, the shocked
Chinese delegation attending the Versailles Conference refused to sign the Versailles
Treaty. When news of the treaty was reported in China on May 4th, 1919, 5,000 students held
demonstrations at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, protesting China’s unfair treatment by the
international community and the Republican government’s inability to defend Chinese interests
internationally. Students were later joined by other intellectuals, such as professors and
journalists; attempting to find alternatives to the weak democracy in place and solutions to save
China, these intellectuals began to swing from liberalism to radicalism and nationalism.
The Communist Party rose in China against the backdrop of incompetent and corrupt
governance under Yuan Shikai, the Warlord Era that followed, and foreign oppression. Early
Communist leaders were highly anti-traditionalist and anti-Confucianism, blaming the old order
for China’s current weakness. Chen Duxiu was one of the earliest Chinese academic converts to
32
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Communism. His experience studying abroad in Japan and France exposed him to Western
culture and ideals of individual freedom and inspired him to found the influential magazine Xin
Qingnian (known as New Youth in English and La Jeunesse in French). 33 He became
increasingly critical of Confucianism, arguing that it was too antiquated a discipline for Chinese
society to follow:
Confucius lived in a feudal age. The ethics he promoted is the ethics of the feudal
age. The social mores he taught and even his own mode of living were teachings
and modes of a feudal age. The objectives, ethics, social norms, mode of living,
and political institutions did not go beyond the privilege and prestige of a few
rulers and aristocrats and had nothing to do with the happiness of the great
masses. How can this be shown? In the teachings of Confucius, the most
important elements in social ethics and social life are the rules of decorum and the
most serious thing in government is punishment.34
Anti-Confucianism was further exacerbated among Communists during Republican
China because the KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek seemingly embraced it. "When the
Nationalist Kuomintang government centralized governance of the national education system, in
1929, then President Chiang Kai-shek (1943) prescribed the Confucian moral precepts of
“loyalty, filial piety, humanity, love, faithfulness, harmony, and peacefulness (zhong, xiao, ren,
ai, xin, yi, heping)” as guiding principles for educational institutions throughout the
country."35 Chiang further advocated a return to Confucianism, believing that it should be made
the basis of modern reforms – this belief was essentially codified in the New Life Movement that
Chiang initiated in 1934.36
Communist antipathy toward Confucianism would persist, beyond the Communist
victory in the Chinese Civil War and founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and
33
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reach its zenith over 15 years later during the Cultural Revolution. In August of 1966, Mao
Zedong and his leftist supporters, frustrated by what they viewed as increasing revisionism and
political stagnancy, launched the Cultural Revolution against CCP moderates like Liu Shaoxi
and Deng Xiaoping, accusing them of having lost their revolutionary zeal. Believing that it was
insufficient for the new generation of Chinese youth to simply read theoretical and historical
works and sing the revolutionary songs, Mao and his supporters pushed for the youth to
participate as active citizens in the Chinese nation by making iconoclastic revolution, just as Mao
and his generation had.
At a mass meeting held in Tiananmen Square for National Day in October 1966, Mao
mobilized the Red Guard by appealing directly to them, calling on them to destroy the “Four
Olds”: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. He closed the schools and ordered the
Red Guards to go forth, challenge Party officials, and attack anything bourgeois and traditional;
to that end, the Red Guards were encouraged to destroy old buildings, temples, and art objects in
their towns and villages. In Shandong Province, Red Guards “swept through Qufu, the
birthplace of Confucius, damaging every relic associated with the sage, thus perpetrating their
‘thorough crushing of the Confucian establishment.’”37 Mao’s goal was to ideologically reform
Chinese society in a way that “explicitly rejected Confucian humanist universalism and moral
self-cultivation in favor of intense class consciousness and class struggle.” 38
However, for all practical intents and purposes, Confucianism had already been largely
discarded by Chinese society prior to the Cultural Revolution:
‘Confucianism,’ though a prime target of attack, had long since been eclipsed
educationally and politically – largely replaced by Western-style learning in the
first decades of the century and then, post-1949, by a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist
37
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ideology and curriculum in the schools. Except among a few remnants of the
older generation, Confucianism was perceived negatively through the antiConfucian diatribes of the New Culture and May 4 Movements. 39
As a result, Confucius, as a figurehead, had to be re-imagined to play a useful role in Cultural
Revolution propaganda:
The historical discussion soon came to focus on the role of Confucius during the
transitional era, with general agreement not only that Confucianism was a
reactionary philosophy in modern times but that Confucius himself had been a
reactionary in his own time, the author of a doctrine that had impeded the
historically progressive transition from ‘slavery’ to ‘feudalism.’ 40
When recast under this anti-Confucian light, Qin Shihuang, the First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty,
who had previously been popularly vilified as a brutally oppressive tyrant, was suddenly
portrayed as a “great unifier.”41 “The scholars argued that even such Draconian actions as his
burning of the Confucian books and burying alive of the scholars had been necessary in order to
consolidate the ‘dictatorship of the landlord class.’”42
In May 1973, Mao proposed a “Criticize Confucius” campaign at a working session of
the Party Central as a means to implicitly criticize Zhou Enlai. 43 This led to an increase in
articles directly attacking Confucius and Confucian traditions being published in the summer of
1973. By the end of the summer, after the Tenth Party Congress, the propaganda campaign
against Confucius was linked to the disgraced general, politician and Mao’s one-time likely
successor, Lin Biao, who died in a plane crash in 1971 while allegedly fleeing to Mongolia after
an attempted coup to overthrow Mao. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, launched a nationwide campaign
by commissioning “a booklet known as the Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,
based on a cache of documents and materials left by Lin Biao in his Maojiawan
39
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residence.”44 Lin Biao became the “modern personification of the old Confucian scholars...who
had set themselves against the progressive forces of history, promoting political factionalism,
territorial separatism, outmoded ideas, and antiquated social relationships.” 45 This campaign,
known as “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” (“Pi Lin, Pi Kong”), “was made the focus for mass
rallies and intense group discussions in party cells and universities, in the PLA and the local
militia units, in communes and factories” 46 and dominated Chinese governmental propaganda
and the political narrative for over a year before fading away.
By the time the Cultural Revolution ended, in September 1976 after Mao’s death, over 70
percent of Beijing’s cultural or historic landmarks were destroyed; one of the most famous
historic landmarks in Beijing, the Forbidden City, was “reportedly saved only by Zhou Enlai’s
personal intervention.”47 Jiang Qing and the rest of the Gang of Four, who were largely
responsible for instigating much of the iconoclastic destruction during the Cultural Revolution,
were arrested and tried. The two most powerful political figures immediately following Mao’s
death and the arrest of the Gang of Four were Hua Guofeng, the man who claimed to be Mao’s
designated successor, and Deng Xiaoping. Though both leaders initially pursued politics of
social stability (shehui wending) and maintaining social order (shehui zhi’an),48 by 1978, Hua,
who advocated reforms that adhered closer to Maoist ideals, was politically outmaneuvered by
Deng, who pursued more pragmatic reforms.
Once Deng Xiaoping consolidated power, the Chinese government “no longer invoked
Marxist revolutionary morality and class struggle (as in the Cultural Revolution) to guard the
gates against Western liberal decadence, but instead leaned toward a conservative brand of
44
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Confucianism to buttress the status quo.”49 In a sense, Confucianism not only filled an
ideological vacuum after the Cultural Revolution, but it was attractive to CCP leadership “for the
same reasons that Chinese imperial dynasties initially found it attractive: it “provides an
ideological pillar of support for the ruling political order, while simultaneously allowing the
regime opportunities to dress itself in the themes of benevolence and
humanitarianism.”50 Furthermore, it is a non-religious ideology that no longer presented a threat
to the CCP. To support this ideological shift, the Chinese government supported a conservative
form of nationalism – one that celebrated rather than vilify China’s traditional history and
cultural heritage. While this ideological shift was primarily directed at a Chinese domestic
audience, its impact was also felt in Chinese foreign relations. While China was largely
xenophobic under Mao, Deng’s regime was considerably more extroverted, especially “in terms
of tourism, printed and visual media, and the performing arts.” 51
Confucius was once again resurrected and re-imagined to be the popular symbol of what
Oksenberg described as “confident Chinese nationalism.” 52 In 1984, Deng’s central government
supported the establishment of the Confucius Foundation of China, an organization that
fundraises and promotes Confucius, Confucianism, and Chinese traditional research in order “to
strengthen the building of socialist spiritual civilization and material civilization, to promote
international cultural exchanges and promote world peace, unity and progress of career
services.”53 In October 1989, this organization staged an elaborate celebration of the 2,540th
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anniversary of Confucius’s birthday in Beijing. 54 The timing of this event was significant, as it
was only a few months after the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square. At the event, Gu Mu, a close adviser of Deng Xiaoping, gave a speech
endorsing Confucian values as a means to Chinese societal harmony and discipline:
As is known to all, the idea of harmony is an important component of the Chinese
traditional culture. As early as the last years of the West Zhou dynasty three
thousand years ago, ancient scholars elucidated the brilliant idea of ‘harmony
making for prosperity.’ Later Confucius and the Confucian school put forward
the proposition of ‘harmony above all’ and established theories on the
coordination of interpersonal relations, the protection of the natural environment,
and the maintenance of ecological balance. These thoughts not only made
positive contributions to the prosperity of ancient Chinese society but also have
profound practical significance for the survival and development of mankind
today.55
Since then, the government has sponsored annual commemorations of the anniversary of
Confucius’ birthday; the “annual September festivals in Qufu have also featured conferences
highlighting the resurgence of academic study of Confucius and Confucianism,” while “[major]
symposia were scheduled at five-year intervals to draw scholars from abroad as well.” 56 Over
the years, these commemorations have expanded into grander affairs:
Manifestations of this conservative cultural nationalism included a highly
publicized international conference held in 1994 to celebrate the 2,545th birthday
of Confucius, the reintroduction of Confucian teachings in the schools, and the
establishment of an ‘International Association of Confucian Studies’ in Beijing –
which, appropriately, selected as its honorary president Lee Kuan-yew, the neoConfucian dictator of Singapore. And perhaps even more bizarre were the quasiofficial ceremonies of worship, including kowtowing and the burning of incense,
performed at the ‘tomb’ of the mythical Yellow Emperor.57
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Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng Xiaoping after he
relinquished the last of his leadership posts, Chinese “foreign relations discourse [expressed] an
increasingly modernist appreciation of China’s cultural traditions as a basis of Beijing’s
interactions with the world.” 58 Miller and Liu note that “[although] neither Qian Qichen nor
Jiang Zemin has cited Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao in presentations of PRC foreign
policy to the United Nations in the 1990s, they have several times referred to adages of
Confucius and other sources of Chinese tradition.” 59 Furthermore, though Hanban was
established during Deng’s regime, Jiang’s regime oversaw the expansion of state support for
other language and cultural promotion organizations. This support, as well as the overall
rehabilitation of Confucius, has carried on into the fourth and fifth generations of Chinese
leadership, under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, respectively. The ideological shift away from
Maoism has been more noticeable in these generations:
Confronting the new challenges of the twenty-first century, and in a world where
Leninism had collapsed, Hu and Wen turned to traditional wisdom. They
described their reform aspirations not in terms of the utopian visions of Mao’s
continuous revolution, but by the goal of building a ‘xiaokang’ (‘moderately welloff’) society – a term with distinctly Confucian connotations. 60
Confucian values have even been reformed to the point where they represent good,
virtuous governance again. Confucius is frequently referred to by Chinese officials when
discussing anti-corruption or austerity measures. Frugality has long been identified as a
desirable aspect of Confucian governance:
One early-eighteenth-century emperor, for example, declared a permanent freeze
on tax rates as a show of Confucian thriftiness. (Although this policy eventually
backfired: the tax ceiling hampered the government’s ability to generate revenues
58
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for the remainder of its 200 years in power.) Campaigns against corruption –
including arrests of senior ministers – were a regular feature of late imperial times.
Even the major political upheavals of the twentieth century turned on questions of
corruption and frugality. The Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek, who took over
as head of state of the Republic of China after Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925,
quickly earned a reputation for corruption. Chiang responded by promoting neoConfucian values as part of what he called his New Life movement, which made
‘simplicity and frugality’ one of its core virtues. But he ultimately fell to Mao
Zedong, who promoted an even more radical notion of the austere state. Mao
demanded that Communist Party cadres reject the slightest hint of bourgeois
comfort, including by wearing a uniform of a nondescript Mao suit. Although
Mao ended up living more like a Roman emperor than a Spartan soldier, he was
effective at creating the perception that the Communists were incorruptible, in
stark contrast to the Nationalist Party’s reputation for graft. As Confucius would
have predicted, this helped the Communists win the “hearts and minds” of the
people. 61
Most recently, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping has displayed its respect for Confucian
values in public service by implementing anti-corruption measures like banning extravagance at
official gatherings like the National People’s Congress: these gatherings would no longer have
all-you-can-eat buffets or serve seafood.
The successful rehabilitation of Confucius’s image among China’s domestic audience
made him a prime candidate to represent popular Chinese culture and national pride on the
international stage. Praised “as the heart of China’s glorious civilization,” Confucian
iconography “now bolsters rather than threatens the national self-esteem of Chinese cultural
nationalists.”62 As such, the government has directed the “restoration or complete reconstruction
of buildings all across China that had once served as temples of Confucius but later were
[damaged during the Cultural Revolution or] converted to other uses.” 63 During the opening of
the 2008 Summer Olympics, Hu Jintao opened his welcome speech with a famous Confucian
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line from Lun Yu, or the Analects: “To have friends come from afar, is it not a joy?” 64 The
opening ceremonies also featured “a massive choir dressed as disciples of Confucius, waving
bamboo slips of text and chanting quotations from The Analects.”65 In 2009, a state-owned film
company produced an expensive historical film promoting Confucius that featured international
film star Chow Yun-Fat. In January 2011, a 31-foot statue of Confucius was erected in
Tiananmen Square; though the statue was suddenly moved a few months later to a less
prominent position on the west side of the National Museum, 66 its original placement in
Tiananmen Square was especially symbolic, as the only other Chinese figure to be honored in
Tiananmen Square is Mao Zedong, whose mausoleum is located on the premises and portrait is
on the Forbidden City. The Confucius brand has even been applied to a fine-dining trend, as
restaurants in Qufu, Shandong are making moves to open up the regional tourist industry by
offering “Confucius cuisine” – dishes that are supposedly creative re-imaginations of dishes
developed over the centuries in Qufu.67
Confucius' brand has been used to garner prestige for international awards. In late 2005,
the Chinese government and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) joined forces to establish the Confucius Literary Prize. “The purpose
of the Confucius Literary Prize is to reward nongovernmental organizations that are working to
promote literacy among disadvantaged people, such as rural adults and youths who are not in
school, and particularly women and girls.” 68 However, Confucius’ brand has also been used less
successfully to promote a Chinese international peace prize. The Chinese government was
64
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reportedly involved with establishing the “Confucius Peace Prize” in December 2010 in response
to the awarding of that year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese political dissident Liu Xiaobo:
The identity of the nominally private Chinese organization that awarded the prize
was never made clear in media accounts, and it remains an opaque institution.
However, the group’s chairman reportedly acknowledged that the group had a
close relationship with the PRC.69
The award’s first recipient was former Taiwanese Vice-President and Kuomintang Party
Chairman Lien Chan, who was recognized for his efforts in improving cross-strait relations with
mainland China. However, their efforts at countering the Nobel Peace Prize "prompted far more
derision than admiration" internationally, 70 as Lien himself was not present at the ceremony and
officially disassociated himself from the transparent, politically-motivated award.71
Some also suspect that the government-directed revival and promotion of China’s
Confucian heritage is designed to send a political message to China’s neighbors. Believing that
“Confucian” culture acts as shorthand for “Chinese” culture, heritage, or identity, Murray argues
that “one motive was to encourage closer relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose leaders
had never repudiated Confucius or traditional Chinese culture.” 72 Furthermore, she argues that
“China’s re-embracing of Confucius and government-funded revivals of traditional ceremonies
and structures are also intended to create a positive climate to attract overseas Chinese back to
the motherland and foster closer relations with East Asian nations that share some form of
Confucius heritage.”73
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3.2

History of the Confucius Institutes
The Confucius Institutes are the primary tools the Chinese government uses to execute its

language policies internationally. The Confucius Institutes are non-profit institutions established
in foreign countries with the stated intent of promoting the Chinese language and culture in those
countries. 74 The scope of Confucius Institute activities currently include “teaching Chinese,
training teachers of Chinese, administering the HSK international Chinese language qualiﬁcation
and other examinations, teaching Chinese culture courses, holding ﬁlm shows and similar
activities, acting as consultants for individuals interested in China, such as business people, and
maintaining a reference library." 75
Initially, China’s external language policy was carried out by the Beijing Language
Institute. Established in 1962 and officially named in 1964, the Beijing Language Institute
focused on teaching Chinese to foreign students in China. 76 In 1987, China became much more
active in teaching Chinese to non-native speakers when the Beijing-based Office of Chinese
Language Council International (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu
Bangongshi, or colloquially known as Hanban) was established. As the main objective of the
government’s CFL initiatives had shifted from “merely the education of foreign students to the
development of a commercial education market,”77 Hanban’s primary responsibilities included
“initiating policies, and sponsoring activities, of Chinese language studies, cultural exhibitions,
and exchanges.”78 “After the establishment of Hanban, the speed of implementation of projects
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accelerated.”79 In 1996, the Beijing Language Institute was upgraded and renamed as the
“Beijing Language and Culture University”; in 2002, it was renamed again as “Beijing Language
University.” In 1993, the “International Training Center of Chinese Language” was established;
in 2000, it would be renamed as the “College of Chinese Language and Culture.” 80 However,
these initiatives were still internal because they were only directed at foreign students within
China; the most proactive of Hanban’s external initiatives to teach Chinese as a foreign language
was the establishment of the Confucius Institutes.
The Confucius Institutes project was initiated in 2002, when the Chinese government
announced that it intended to set up Chinese language and cultural institutions overseas; the pilot
institute for this project was established on June 15, 2004 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. However,
the first official overseas Confucius Institute opened on November 21, 2004 in Seoul, South
Korea. Some analysts have argued that establishing the first official institute in South Korea was
a calculated move by the Chinese government:
The choice of Seoul as the location of the ﬁrst Confucius Institute sent messages
to many people: the South Koreans (back in the Chinese fold), the North Koreans
(do not count on fraternal Communist ties), the Japanese (China and Korea stand
united against Japanese aggression) and the US (Korea is our sphere of inﬂuence).
This CI programme is part of the message China is sending to the world that, in
Hong Kong parlance, China has had several bad centuries but is now back as the
‘central state’ Zhongguo.81
Although the first Confucius Institutes established were geographically close to China,
they quickly expanded throughout the world. Prior to the opening of the Confucius Institute in
Seoul in November 2004, Hanban had already inked deals with the University of Maryland,
Stockholm University, and Nairobi University to build the first Confucius Institutes in the United
79
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States, Europe, and Africa respectively. As of 2013, according to Confucius Institute Online,82
there are 833 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, the Confucius Institutes’ primary
and secondary education affiliates, worldwide: 127 in Asia, 241 in Europe, 399 in North and
South America, 30 in Africa, and 36 in the Oceania. Of those located in the Americas, 339 are
located in the United States.
Beijing modeled the Confucius Institutes after comparable cultural institutions for other
countries, such as France’s Alliance Française, Germany’s Goethe Institute, the United
Kingdom’s British Council, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, Portugal’s Instituto Camões, and
Japan’s Japan Foundation, with the goal of developing Beijing’s cultural diplomacy:
France started its cultural diplomacy after its defeat in the war against Prussia
(1870–1) and founded the Alliance Françoise in 1883 by “invoking her cultural
patrimony as a means of rehabilitation”. The British Council was set-up in 1934
as a reaction to the success of official cultural institutions of France, Germany and
Italy and “to counteract Nazi plans for global cultural hegemony”. And
Germany’s Goethe-Institute was set-up with the initial idea to rehabilitate
Germany’s reputation after World War II. [The] Confucius Institutes, which are
not only designed to teach language and promote culture, but are “also aimed at
balancing the dominant American (popular) cultural influence”. Furthermore, [the]
Confucius Institutes also contribute, at least indirectly, to China’s foreign policy
agenda.”83
The implications of Beijing’s cultural diplomacy, linguistic policy and successful expansion of
the Confucius Institutes have not been lost on Beijing’s neighbors. Taiwan recently took steps in
2011 to compete with Beijing in cultural diplomacy by creating “Taiwan Academies” –
international cultural centers that are similar to the Confucius Institutes but intended “to promote
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Taiwanese-flavored Mandarin and traditional Chinese characters, and also sponsor research on
Taiwan-related topics.”84
The Confucius Institutes as a Source of National Prestige
One of the reasons that the Confucius Institutes themselves have become a source of
national prestige is that they are symbolic of Chinese greatness to cultural nationalists.
Academic articles that touch on the Confucius Institutes frequently do so in the same breath as
soft power and other cultural sources of Chinese national pride, such as the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympics and the growing popularity of Chinese martial arts, sports figures, cinema and
literature.85 The institutes use a distinctively Chinese philosophy as a symbol for selfpromotion. The Chinese language has been objectified to serve as a “symbol of the Chinese
nation” and as an “important agent for national cohesiveness” to instrumentalist cultural
nationalists86; the Confucius Institutes primarily focus on teaching the Chinese language, this
symbol of Chinese cultural greatness, to receptive audiences in their host communities. The
Confucius Institutes also work with the local host communities to promote other traditions that
objectify Chinese culture, such as “Chinese medicine, Kongfu, Qigong, calligraphy, Chinese
painting, Chinese songs and dances and Chinese cuisine.”87
The Confucius Institutes also demonstrate internationally the extent to which Chinese
society and traditions value education. The quality of educational programs that they provide
internationally can be seen as an extension of the Chinese domestic education system and
84
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indicative of the domestic system’s quality. According to former Minister of Education Zhou Ji,
the Confucius Institutes help “Chinese higher education gain international recognition for its
delivery of educational services in the global market and expand Chinese influence
worldwide."88 The institutes have worked hard to compete with other comparable language and
cultural programs; Zhang Hong from China Today, a popular monthly magazine that tends to
promote a favorable view of China to international and domestic audiences, wrote with implicit
pride: "Akin to Germany’s Goethe Institute and Spain’s Institute de Cervantes in Beijing,
Confucius Institute represents quality Chinese language training on an international stage.”89
The actual success and rapid expansion of the Confucius Institutes have also become a
source of national prestige in China. It is important to remember that the Confucius Institutes are
language and cultural outreach programs designed to "spread a Chinese government-approved
interpretation of China’s heritage and encourage foreigners to understand and appreciate
it."90 The establishment of the institutes in 2004 is “the ﬁrst time that China formulated and
implemented a plan to popularize the Chinese around the world in a systematic way and on such
a massive scale.”91 The high rate of proliferation of Confucius Institutes means that international
audiences are positively receiving a Chinese cultural product that has been carefully crafted,
packaged, and delivered by the Chinese government. It ultimately serves as a metric for
measuring the rise of China and growing Chinese influence internationally.
Due to their successful expansion, with Confucius Institutes and Classrooms being
established in about 100 countries and on every continent except Antarctica, the Chinese
government has pursued aggressive goals in increasing the number of new Chinese teachers. In
88
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2005, their goal was to train 100 million new Chinese speakers over the next five years 92; at the
time, there were approximately 30 million non-Chinese people in about 100 countries studying
Chinese as a second language. 93 “The global demand for Chinese language education has kept
pace with the country’s economic development since China initiated its modernization process in
early 1980s. According to a recent survey, 38 percent of human resource and ﬁnancial directors
in Europe—as well as Australia and New Zealand—expect Chinese to become the most valuable
business language—other than English—in the near future.”94 The increased global demand for
the Chinese language has necessitated recruitment campaigns for native Chinese speakers to go
abroad to teach Chinese:
Today, just 3,000 people hold the Certificate for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign
Language issued by the Chinese Ministry of Education. However another 6,000
are doing the job on a full time or part time basis. With 60,000 foreign students in
China, it’s hard enough trying to find qualified teachers to work at home, never
mind in Malaysia or the United States... In an effort to improve the situation, in
2004, the government staged the “China International Chinese teacher volunteer
plan.” The NOCFL set up a volunteer center to handle the recruitment, training
and financing of suitable volunteers who wish to teach Chinese abroad. Around
30,000 people have so far expressed an interest in the volunteer program. 95
Finally, the success of the Confucius Institutes is indicative of the rise of China and
increased global competitiveness. “Learning Chinese isn't just a way for Americans to get jobs
in China, but for them to do business with Chinese companies and compete with Mandarin
speakers from other countries.”96 In other words, Chinese businesses and industries have
become such a dominant force in the global marketplace that learning to communicate in
Chinese has now become a profitable endeavor for foreigners. The Confucius Institutes, a
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symbol of the rise of China, also use “benign activities to counter external pressures associated
with the ‘China threat theory.’” 97 In doing so they reinforce the government-promoted concept
of heping jueqi, or “Peaceful Rise”98 – the idea that China’s rise will not change its status as “a
‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system” 99

3.3.

Procedures to Establishing a Confucius Institute
Scholars have identified three types of Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms

worldwide: ones that are operated entirely by Hanban, ones that are operated locally but
licensed by Hanban’s headquarters, and ones that are operated as a joint venture between
Hanban and the local partners.100 The joint venture is the most common type of organization for
Confucius Institutes101; within the United States, these joint ventures are generally hosted on
university campuses. Joint ventures are the most prevalent form of organization because they are
mutually beneficial to Hanban and the local partners; universities are able to pursue Sinology
programs that they otherwise may not have the money to do without funding from Hanban,
while Hanban and the Confucius Institutes gain prestige and credibility from their association
with universities as well as international partners to co-finance Chinese cultural diplomacy. 102
In order to establish a Confucius Institute on their campus, interested universities must
submit a proposal to Hanban’s headquarters. Successful applicants will submit proposals that
demonstrate the following:
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(i) There is a strong demand for Chinese language instruction in the university
and local community;
(ii) The potential host organization is willing and able to contribute to the
establishment and the growth of the CI both fiscally and physically; and
(iii) A partner organization has been pre-selected for the CI for this endeavor.103
In other words, host applicants need to demonstrate to Hanban that they have strong local
demand and the resources, in terms of capital, facilities, personnel, and equipment, to establish
and develop a profitable and sustainable institute at their location.
One factor not explicitly mentioned in the above list is that successful applicants will
generally be located in areas of strategic importance to Chinese foreign policy. In his 2010 study,
Lee determined that over 60% of active Confucius Institutes were concentrated in East Asia, the
EU, and the US – the three regions of greatest geopolitical importance to the Chinese
government.104 Therefore, successful proposals are most likely to come from countries with
large GDPs and population sizes because these factors indicate that these countries either already
have strong trade and/or foreign direct investment relationships with China or the high potential
to develop relationships.105 Furthermore, since the lingua franca in the aforementioned areas of
geopolitical importance tends to be English, successful applicants are more likely to come from
countries that speak English. 106
Once the proposal is submitted, Hanban will evaluate whether to approve the
establishment of a new institute. Successful applications generally take about a year and a half
to be reviewed. Once final approval is given by Hanban’s headquarters, two contracts will be
signed: one between Hanban headquarters and the host applicant and the other between the host
103
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applicant and its Chinese partner organization. Once the two agreements are signed, Hanban
provides the start-up funding for the new Confucius Institute. Though Hanban pays for the startup costs of the Confucius Institutes, subsequent annual funding for operation costs are shared
between Hanban and the host organization for the life of the contract. The contracts signed
generally range between three to five years, though Hanban is beginning to sign more long-term
contracts with newly-established Confucius Institutes.
Chinese Governmental Support of the Confucius Institutes
The Chinese government’s increased attentiveness to China’s national image is “not only
reflected in concepts such as Peaceful Rise/Development and Harmonious World,”107 but also in
the cultural diplomacy initiatives that are part of the so-called “charm offensive”108 designed to
combat the perception of the “China threat.” One element of this “charm offensive” is
internationalizing Chinese media – “Xinhua, CCTV and China Daily receive vast sums of money
[from the Chinese government] to ‘go out’ and explain China’s point of view to the world.” 109 It
is also spearheading initiatives to improve China’s national image from within other countries,
primarily through the funding of organizations like Hanban and the Confucius Institutes.
The Chinese government, though the Ministry of Education, provides a massive amount
of funding to finance the Confucius Institutes and other Hanban activities. As previously
mentioned, Hanban pays for the start-up costs of each institute plus 50% of the annual operation
costs for the life of the contract. The local partners’ shares of annual operation costs are usually
provided in the form of local personnel and facilities while the Chinese partners provide
personnel (a co-director and additional instructors). Hanban provides its share in the form of

107

Hartig, 54.
Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007).
109
Hartig, 54.
108

76

Chapter Three: The Confucius Institutes

capital and equipment 110; Starr estimates that Hanban provides about 3,000 books, other items of
teaching materials, and pays the salaries of the instructors sent from China to teach at the
Confucius Institutes.111 Many analysts estimate that the start-up funds provided for each institute
by Hanban average approximately USD $150,000.112
It has been especially difficult to estimate how much Hanban spends on each Confucius
Institute on average annually. Though the “unique facilities-sharing arrangement with local
institutions contributes to the better operating efficiency of the CI,” Lien and Oh estimate that the
annual operation cost for an average Confucius Institute, at approximately USD $500,000, is still
relatively high when compared to the average start-up fund.113 However, other studies have
estimated that the average annual budget for Confucius Institutes to be much lower, ranging from
USD $100,000 to USD $200,000.114
As it is difficult to assess the average annual budgets for the Confucius Institutes, it is
also difficult to get an accurate account of how large Hanban’s worldwide budget actually
is. Some sources have reported Hanban’s annual budget to range between USD $15-26
million, 115 while others have estimated that in 2010 alone, the Chinese government budgeted
CNY ¥800 million (approximately USD $127 million) to support the Confucius Institutes
worldwide.116 While this high level of funding may lead to concerns about Chinese
governmental spending on cultural diplomacy or international propaganda, it is important to note
that the annual spending for comparable organizations is much higher; “the annual budget of the
British Council is about [USD $1billion] and the budget of Germany’s Goethe Institut in 2010
110
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was about [EUR €334 million, or USD $443 million] with roughly [EUR €223 million, or USD
$296 million] donation from the German Federal Foreign Office.” 117
While non-academics may be concerned with Chinese cultural diplomacy or soft power
initiatives and the political implications of high levels of governmental spending on the
Confucius Institutes, some academics working with the local host universities have been
primarily concerned with maintaining funding and the long-term sustainability of the
program. 118 Though the Confucius Institutes are specified as non-profit organizations, the
expectation with Hanban has always been that the Institutes would eventually become selffinancing and charge course fees. However, as the contracts for most of the early-established
Confucius Institutes were signed for only a three-year duration, there was initially some concern
that three years would not be enough time for the Institutes to become self-sustainable. To
address these concerns, Hanban has steadily increased the average contract duration, with many
of the newly-established Confucius Institutes now signing five-year contracts. The concerns of
local partners on long-term sustainability and funding have also been alleviated by the inclusion
of the Confucius Institutes in the Ministry of Education’s most recent Ten-year plan, the
“National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (20102020).”119 As a result, local partners can now feel a greater degree of confidence that Hanban
will match funding for their Confucius Institutes until at least 2020.
Hanban’s relationship with the Chinese government is not limited to funding: Hanban is
actually composed of “representatives from 12 ministries and commissions within the Chinese
central government.”120 When it was first established, Hanban was primarily designed to be a
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language education institution that fell under the purveyorship of the Ministry of Education.
However, Hanban currently serves as an extension of CCP bureaucracy, as Beijing “gradually
expanded Hanban’s functions to include cultural exchanges and placed it under the joint
governance of...different ministries and commissions collectively responsible for education,
culture, foreign affairs and strategic planning for long-term national development.”121
Hanban’s ‘leading group’ refers to “a group of officials seconded from various ministries
chaired by a State Councillor.” 122 This essentially means that high-ranking members of the CCP
wield a great degree of control within Hanban’s headquarters, which issues guidelines and
assessments to the Confucius Institutes worldwide. It has been argued that, with this type of
governance structure, the Confucius Institutes cannot possibly act as independent, nongovernmental institutions.123 For example, the Confucius Institutes’ first director, Chen Zhili,
was also a State Councilor and the Minister of Education. Hanban’s last director, Liu Yandong,
is the highest-ranked female member of the Communist Party, currently serving as Vice-Premier
to Premier Li Keqiang; when she served as Hanban’s director, she was also concurrently a
member of the CCP’s Central Committee Political Bureau and State Councilor. Similarly, Xu
Lin, the current Director-General of the Confucius Institute Headquarters and Director of
Hanban, is also a State Councilor and former Assistant Director-General and Deputy DirectorGeneral of the Finance Department of the Ministry of Education. 124 At least two of the four
Deputy Director Generals of the Confucius Institute Headquarters125 under Xu Lin, Hu Zhiping
and Jing Wei, have also held high positions within the Ministry of Education.
121
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3.4

Summary
The Chinese government has invested considerable resources to promote their written

and spoken linguistic preferences internationally. They recruited Confucius, a Chinese historic
figure that had been revered for hundreds of years in China but vilified during early CCP rule, to
serve as the namesake for their international language and cultural outreach programs. They
have heavily supported the institutes financially, politically and administratively by spending
potentially over USD $125 million annually and providing leadership through high-level
representatives from the Ministry of Education. The next chapter will focus on Confucius
Institutes in the United States as an element of Chinese foreign policy and how these institutes
have been received by the American public.
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In 2012, the Obama administration announced a shift in American foreign policy and
grand strategy. Initiated in 2010, the shift was dubbed a “pivot” to Asia – “a shift in strategy
aimed at bolstering the United States' defense ties with countries throughout the region and
expanding the U.S. naval presence there.”1 The primary objective of the shift was to draw
American resources and focus away from costly engagements in the Middle East. However, it
was also conceived in response to a perceived increase in Chinese aggression, especially with
Japan and Southeast Asian neighbors over territorial disputes in the East China and South China
Seas and with Western nations over the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the imprisoned
Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo.
Chinese policymakers fear this so-called “pivot” is nothing more than “a conspiracy to
‘contain’ China and deny the nation its proper place in the world despite its enormous economic
and military progress.”2 However, this “pivot,” or “rebalancing” 3 as it was later rebranded, could
be understood in two ways: rebalancing American foreign policy priorities and rebalancing
regional hegemonic power in Asia. American National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon
explained that the shift in American foreign policy strategy responded “to the strong demand
signal from leaders and publics across the region for U.S. leadership, economic engagement,
sustained attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and norms.” 4 If this
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is the case, then “[in] a few short months, China…managed to undo much of what it had gained
through years of talk about its ‘peaceful rise’,"5 especially in terms of soft power.
The foreign policy strategy of most nations includes increasing economic and military
power and projecting the nations’ political and economic influence abroad as much as possible;
these actions are meant to provide a favorable international environment in which the nation is
secure and prosperous. China is no exception to this and Chinese policymakers would like the
United States to change its foreign policy to reduce American influence in Asia as quickly as
possible. “For a rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens
its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy includes soft power to make
China look less frightening and the balancing coalitions less effective.” 6 In other words,
successfully improving China’s international image and increasing its soft power would be one
way to downplay the need, with its neighbors and with the United States, for increased American
regional engagement. Therefore, the success of the Confucius Institutes is even more important
for Chinese public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy.
The Confucius Institutes have had mixed receptions in the United States. American
academics, journalists and political pundits have debated over various aspects of the Confucius
Institutes, from how they increase Chinese soft power to the extent to which their presence on
university and college campuses hamper academic independence. These topics have been
featured in academic journals and both written and broadcast national news media. Since
domestic public opinion is a salient driving force in the creation of American foreign policy, how
these cultural outreach programs are received in the United States will help to determine how
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successful Chinese foreign policy strategies using soft power will ultimately be. It is important
to study how these topics have been framed and presented, as this may affect how the Confucius
Institutes are received by the American public.
This chapter will begin with a discussion on the relationship between political legitimacy,
media coverage and American public opinion, and how these ultimately impact American
foreign policymaking. It will continue with discussions of the primary debates surrounding the
Confucius Institutes, namely the soft power and academic independence debates. This chapter
will conclude with a media content analysis which will explore the extent to which the media has
covered the Confucius Institutes and how they have been portrayed to the American public.

4.1

Media Framing, Public Opinion, and Policy
In the United States, public opinion is shaped in large part by the choice in foreign policy

issues covered by mass media and how those issues are presented to the American public. This
ultimately impacts the American foreign policy process and whether the policies pursued by the
government are viewed as legitimate. Mass media has drastically evolved since the 1970s:
Television usage increased even more dramatically during that same time period,
with 94 million sets in use in 1994 compared to 59 million sets in 1970… Tied to
this increase in television stations was the growth of cable television systems,
spreading from 2,490 available systems in 1970 to 11,230 systems in 1994, an
increase of 350 percent in twenty-five years. 7
The dramatic increase in television usage and the emergence of 24-hour news stations
have led to what many have dubbed the “CNN effect” on American foreign policy. The
argument is that the media has the power to affect policy by “shaping the public and official
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response to foreign events.”8 When particular foreign policy issues are raised in televised media,
“[government] officials react to the pressure of publicity, and the result is often hasty, illconceived policies that play to the immediate impulses of the public rather than to the long-term
interests of the country.”9 The oft-cited examples of the “CNN effect” in American foreign
policy are the decisions regarding American troop deployment to Somalia in the early 1990s:
The Bush administration’s last minute decision to send the U.S. military on a
humanitarian mission was driven in part by the strong public reaction to the
images of starving children conveyed by evening news program. Similarly, the
Clinton administration’s subsequent and rather abrupt decision to abandon the
military commitment was influenced by the visceral public reaction of outrage to
the image of captured U.S. service personnel being dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu.10
Despite these anecdotal arguments, it is difficult to truly assess the ways in which
increased telecommunications ultimately impact American foreign policy. Mass media heavily
impacts public opinion, as most people use the media as efficient means to construct their social
and political knowledge11; public opinion, or how they evaluate the information transmitted
through the media, is then expressed through polls, elections, or meetings with elected
representatives. However, the degree of agency afforded to mass media – in particular, how they
choose the stories to report on – remains up for debate. One possibility is that the media is an
independent actor that sets the American public agenda. This view gives mass media a high
degree of agency because “policy makers and the public [are dependent] upon the media for
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information about global events (and especially television, for instantaneous communication
from around the world).” 12
Another viewpoint is that the government directly influences public opinion through
mass media. Under this viewpoint, American presidents, “[as] consummate politicians… both
follow and lead public opinion.”13 Presidents have the ability to use mass media as a mouthpiece
for the government’s official agenda, because mass media outlets are dependent upon the
government for access to information and willingly play this role in order to maintain that
access. While some critics may accuse the American mainstream media of playing this role,
especially with the Bush administration during the lead-up to the Iraq War in 200214, other
analysts summarily dismiss the notion:
News reporters do more than simply ‘watch’ and report facts about the government to
their audiences. Rather, they will frequently take a bite out of those they are covering. 15
The third, more moderate possibility is that mass media and American government share a more
of a symbiotic relationship, where each party finds ways to benefit from the other. Though this
possibility may seem more attractive to use in assumptions because it is more moderate, it can
cause a theoretical loop make it more difficult to assess the direction of causation.
In addition to agenda-setting, how mass media frames news stories also shapes the
public’s news-gathering and processing. News is socially constructed through media framing
and the media’s creation of narratives, then is consumed by the public. “While agenda setting
and priming deal with how news may promote issue prioritization or increase issue accessibility,
12
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media framing research examines how news content influences and affects news consumers;”16
frames provide context through selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration, and then become
the basis for cognitive shortcuts when evaluating individual positions. 17 In other words, they are
“the raw materials from which people inevitably draw to form their own versions of reality.” 18
Some scholars on public opinion and foreign policy have theorized that, regardless of the
degree of agency or underlying motives of the mass media outlets, foreign policy simply tends to
not be a salient issue with the American public; if foreign policy is not a salient issue with the
public, then the public will not take the steps to learn more about the issues and the degree to
which the public can influence foreign policy becomes smaller. Indeed, it is conventional
wisdom that American presidential candidates run more effective campaigns by focusing on
domestic policy over foreign policy. Surveys have shown that the American public’s interest in
local and community affairs have historically trumped interest in international affairs; according
to this viewpoint, “the public concern has largely been episodic and tied to particular
international events, and because the public’s knowledge of foreign policy questions has
remained relatively low, its ability to influence policy has remained relatively weak.” 19 Other
theorists share these basic assumptions but arrive at a different conclusion – that though the
American public tends to be uninformed in foreign policy issues, the threat of negative public
opinion is still strong enough to constitute a major threat to the policies which the government
may otherwise find desirable.20
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More recent research recommends taking a more nuanced approach, suggesting that the
“foreign policy attitudes of the American public are not...irrelevant to policymaking.” 21 Two
useful sets of typologies on American foreign policy trends have been provided by Eugene
Wippkopf and Walter Russell Mead. Wippkopf’s “accommodationists” are similar to Mead’s
“Wilsonians” in that they tend to support cooperative international engagement and reject
militant engagement, while the “isolationists” are most similar to the “Jeffersonians” in their
shared tendency to reject cooperative and militant international engagement. 22 Wippkopf’s
“internationalists,” who support both cooperative and militant international engagement, are
somewhat similar to Mead’s “Hamiltonians,” who prefer maintaining a competent, yet not
overpowering military capable of defending national economic interests, such as the expansion
of trade23; the “hardliners” are most similar to Mead’s “Jacksonians,” who tend to pursue more
muscular foreign policies and reject cooperative internationalism. 24
Wippkopf argues that these typologies of the popular strains of American foreign policy
tradition are significant because each group has steadily maintained a roughly equal share of the
American population since the mid-1970s: the implication is that American foreign
policymakers are more constrained than theorists had previously argued, as they now have to
“gauge which groups will support or oppose particular foreign policy actions and must calculate
the acceptable limits of their foreign policy actions.”25 If Thomas Graham is correct in his
estimate that “public opinion must reach at least consensus levels (60 percent and higher) before
it begins to have a discernible effect on decision making,”26 then the case for public opinion
21
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affecting policymaking is somewhat weakened given Woppkopf’s typology. However, this also
implies that if foreign policymakers want to shift foreign policy and push through new agendas
legitimately, they will need to be able to garner significant support from at least three of the four
segments.
Alexander George discussed problems with political legitimacy in foreign policy and
identified two types of legitimacy: normative, which occurs when the proposed policies are in
line with national values and objectives, and cognitive, which means that the proposed policies
are practical and achievable. 27 He argues that when policies lack legitimacy, modern mass media
and volatile public opinion combine to demand especially unreasonably quick results from what
may otherwise be prudent foreign policies. 28 For example, it is arguable that though American
foreign policy in the Middle East may have had a fair degree of normative legitimacy, in that the
American public genuinely preferred to promote democracy in the Middle East, it lacked
cognitive legitimacy. Democratization efforts took a long time to be noticeably effective in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which prompted increased media scrutiny and volatile public opinion; in
this context, the “pivot” to Asia can be interpreted as the impact the American public’s
impatience had on American foreign policy in the Middle East.
The impact media coverage, public opinion, and legitimacy have on American foreign
policy towards China has yet to be determined. Current American public opinion towards China
appears to be deeply ambivalent: though recent polls suggest that a fair majority of the
American public are concerned with China’s rise in economic power, the public is deeply
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divided on its perception of China as a military threat.29 If the Confucius Institutes are framed
favorably in mass media and are successful in engaging with their host communities, they will be
a great asset to Chinese foreign policy in alleviating the American public‘s fears on China as a
rising power and military threat.

4.2

Coverage of the Confucius Institutes

Chinese Soft Power Debate
There is little doubt that the political agenda of the Confucius Institutes is to increase
Chinese soft power and present a benign, favorable image of China to the international
community. Ideally, increasing soft power will assist the Chinese government in attaining their
desired foreign policy objectives through co-option rather than coercion. China has had some
success in using business and culture to increase Chinese soft power and achieve foreign policy
objectives:
Nations from Venezuela to Uzbekistan have proven increasingly willing to work
with China, whether that means Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez vowing to
reorient his massive oil industry toward Beijing and away from America, or
Uzbek leader Islam Karimov tossing US forces out of bases in his country.
Countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have increasingly cut off even their
informal ties to Taiwan, which Beijing claims is a province of China. 30
However, many analysts believe that concerns about rising Chinese soft power are
premature. Though China has dedicated resources to increasing their soft power and influence in
Africa and Latin America, and “the majority of people in both regions appreciate the influx of
Chinese science and technology, most are not impressed with the spread of Chinese ideas and
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customs.”31 The government’s efforts in increasing soft power in the United States also generally
continue to be met with concern about China as a rising power by the American public. 32 As a
result, most analysts believe that China will not be able to overtake the United States in terms of
soft power in the near future.33
Even though most analysts doubt that China will soon overtake the United States in soft
power, the primary concern in the debate involving Chinese soft power and the Confucius
Institutes is that these institutes will allow the Chinese government to use American academic
campuses to issue propaganda. The Confucius Institutes and their international counterparts (the
British Council, Goethe Institute, Maison Française, etc.) all work to increase their respective
countries’ soft power by promoting their languages, cultures and ideologies. What makes the
Confucius Institutes unique and controversial versus their British, Spanish and German
counterparts is that the Confucius Institutes are primarily housed on university campuses and
partially subsidized by universities through matching funds and overhead costs. 34 This presence
of Confucius Institutes on American university campuses becomes especially sensitive because
of China’s rising status as a world power. A recent international survey revealed that it is widely
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believed that China will eventually replace the United States as the leading superpower. 35
Additionally, many analysts have noted the concurrent sharp decline in American soft power
with the rise of Chinese soft power in the early twenty-first century. 36 The Chinese government
having access to American academia through the Confucius Institutes has the potential to
exacerbate these already shifting power balances in hard and soft power; in other words, the
Chinese government would be able to wield American universities and colleges as tools against
the United States in their multifaceted international competition.
There is a fine line between public diplomacy (known facts) and propaganda (a mixture
of facts and untruths),37 and the Chinese government unabashedly admits its desire to improve its
capabilities in both. The CPC’s Central Propaganda Department has promised “to ‘increase the
cultural soft power’ of China through intensifying ‘efforts to “export” cultural products and
services, and strengthen the international influence of Chinese culture.’”38 The government has
also budgeted 45 billion yuan to improve its media capabilities by upgrading CCTV9, a Chinese
24-hour international television channel, to broadcast in English, Spanish, French, Russian, and
Arabic and opening new Xinhua bureaus worldwide. 39 The government’s support of the
Confucius Institutes can be viewed suspiciously as an extension of these initiatives; Li
Changchun, a Politburo member and China’s propaganda chief until November 2012, notably
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referred to the Confucius Institutes as “a huge element of China’s great plan of international
propaganda.”40
Academic Independence Debate
The other frequently raised concern with the Confucius Institutes is whether the presence
of these Chinese government-funded organizations on American collegiate campuses would
inhibit academic freedom. In principle, academics should not only have the freedom but be
encouraged to conduct and share their research, regardless of how controversial the topic may be.
This objectivity is ultimately what contributes to overall academia and human knowledge.
Accusations against the Chinese government for interfering with American academic
freedom have even occurred at institutions that do not host Confucius Institutes.41 For example,
in the summer of 2013, New York University was placed under increased scrutiny when Chinese
dissident Chen Guangcheng accused the university of bowing to pressure from the Chinese
government and forcing him out.42 Chen, a prominent human rights activist and vocal opponent
of China’s one-child policy who garnered much attention in April 2012 when he escaped house
arrest and sought refuge at the American embassy in Beijing, left China after received a visiting
scholar fellowship at NYU in May 2012. Chen claimed that NYU prematurely terminated his
fellowship due to pressure from Beijing. 43 Though he was offered another fellowship from the
Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, NJ after leaving NYU, Chen’s high profile case had already
garnered a lot of media attention, prompting public statements against the Chinese government
40
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D.D. Guttenplan, “Critics Worry About the Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses,” The New York
Times, March 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-of-chinese-instituteson-uscampuses.html?_r=2&sq=Confucius%20Institute&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all (accessed March 20, 2012).
42
“China activist Chen Guangcheng revives concern on US academic freedom,” South China Morning Post, June 18,
2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1263595/china-activist-chen-guangcheng-revives-concern-usacademic-freedom (accessed July 10, 2013).
43
Peter Shadbolt, “Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng: NYU is forcing me out,” CNN, June 17, 2013,
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/17/us/chen-nyu/index.html (accessed July 10, 2013).

92

Chapter Four: Reception of the Confucius Institutes in the United States

from high-ranking congressional members44 and presidential candidates.45 The case drew the
American public’s attention to the potential for academic integrity being compromised by the
Chinese government and potentially influenced the reception of the Confucius Institutes.
Confucius Institutes are capable of both overtly and covertly stifling academic freedom.
One of the most outlandish of charges against the Confucius Institutes is that they act as fronts
that facilitate espionage by the Chinese government. Arthur Waldron, an international relations
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, warned:
Once you have a Confucius Institute on campus, you have a second source of
opinions and authority that is ultimately answerable to the Chinese Communist
Party and which is not subject to scholarly review. [...] You can’t blame the
Chinese government for wanting to mold discussion. But Chinese embassies and
consulates are in the business of observing Chinese students. Should we really be
inviting them onto our campuses? 46
David Matas, a prominent Canadian lawyer for B’nai Brith Canada, also received a fair amount
of publicity after delivering a speech at Cambridge University on China’s human rights records
and abuses and warning that the Confucius Institutes could be used by the government to spy on
Chinese students studying abroad or other organizations that the government may find
subversive, such as the Falun Gong.47 Some analysts also expressed concerns about espionage
when it was revealed that Zhang Baoyong, a board member of the Confucius Institute hosted by
the University of Texas at Dallas, also simultaneously served as executive vice president of
Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecommunication company that some feel presents a danger
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to U.S. cyber security. 48 However, concerns of spying have been largely dismissed by many
academic administrators and observers.49
An oft-cited and more realistic concern is that Hanban would restrict research in topics
that were deemed sensitive by the Chinese government at Confucius Institutes. As per the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes posted to Hanban’s English website, the
Confucius Institutes are prohibited from being involved or participating in “any activities that are
not consistent with the mission of the Confucius Institutes.”50 Given that their mission includes
“strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other
countries,”51 that rule could be interpreted to mean that the Confucius Institutes are prohibited
from sponsoring events that involve sensitive topics like China’s human rights record, Taiwan or
Tibet. Moreover, academics critical of the Chinese government or Chinese policies may not be
welcome to share and discuss their research at a university that hosts a Confucius Institute.
There is the potential for censorship to happen more covertly as well. Many of the
universities and colleges that agree to host Confucius Institutes do so because of the financial
incentives; without Hanban’s assistance, some of these institutions may not have had the funding
or expertise needed to start up, expand or maintain their Chinese language and cultural programs.
This leads to the risk of self-censorship among university administrators and academics, as they
would not want to jeopardize their university’s relationship with Hanban and any future
assistance Hanban may provide. This self-censorship not only affects the universities at the
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institutional level, but also may also have consequences for the careers of individual faculty
members:
One junior faculty member at a U.S. campus with a Confucius Institute responded
to a reporter’s recent query with an e-mail explaining that to be identified as a
critic could end his career: “I am an untenured professor in a department which
receives a lot of money from a C.I., which is run by senior faculty that will vote
on my tenure case.” A colleague, who also did not want to be identified, said the
pressure was subtle. “They aren’t trying to stop debate,” he said. “It’s about the
management of discussions, not the prevention of them.”52
This risk of self-censorship has also influenced whether or not American educational
institutions decide to host Confucius Institutes. Reportedly, faculty members at the University of
Pennsylvania prevented the establishment of a Confucius Institute on their campus due to the risk
of self-censorship.53 Additionally, 174 University of Chicago faculty members signed a letter
objecting to the establishment of a Confucius Institute on their campus:
The letter described the institute as "an academically and politically ambiguous
initiative sponsored by the government of the People’s Republic of China," and
asserted that, "Proceeding without due care to ensure the institute’s academic
integrity, [the administration] has risked having the university’s reputation
legitimate the spread of such Confucius Institutes in this country and beyond."54
Similar to those concerned over the increase in Chinese soft power, critics focused on
academic integrity also raise concerns about the Confucius Institutes and propaganda. Jocelyn
Chey, a former Australian diplomat and scholar with the University of Sydney, conceded that the
Confucius Institutes provided opportunities for universities to improve language and cultural
programs.55 However, she warned of the Confucius Institutes expansion into academic research
beyond linguistics:
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“Universities must preserve academic objectivity. [...] If the [Confucius Institute]
engages in university teaching or research, academic colleagues should beware of
potential bias. The institutes’ close links with the Chinese government and party,
at best, could result in the dumbing down of research and, at worst, produce
propaganda."56
Content Analysis
To study how the Confucius Institutes have been framed and presented to the American
public, articles and transcripts of mass media broadcasts involving the Confucius Institutes have
been pulled from academic journals, media websites and university websites. The types of
sources were targeted because they are the most likely mediums through which the average
American would have been exposed to the Confucius Institutes. Though it was not possible to
obtain a written, digital copy of every single piece published or broadcast on the Confucius
Institutes, the goal was to obtain a sizable sampling from each type of source in order to assess
how the Confucius Institutes have been framed on average.
The phrase “Confucius Institute” was used to find relevant broadcast transcripts and
printed articles for each type of source. The search for broadcast transcripts was limited to the
websites of major news outlets based in the United States like NPR, PBS, ABC News, CBS
News, NBC News, CNN and Fox News in order pull data from the mass media sources that were
most readily available to the average American person. The search for newspaper and magazine
articles was conducted through NexisLexis Academic and limited to U.S.-based newspapers.
Finally, the websites of American universities and colleges that hosted Confucius Institutes were
also searched for published articles on the Confucius Institutes. Unlike the mass media sources,
academic journal articles were limited by topic rather than publication locations; otherwise, the
sample size would have been far too small. However, for academic articles, only articles
56
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mentioning Confucius Institutes hosted within the United States or discussing the organization as
a whole were included in this analysis; in other words, articles that only focused on case studies
such as specific Confucius Institutes in Europe, Australia or Africa were excluded. All together,
338 articles were pulled from the websites of 7 broadcast media outlets, 31 newspapers and
periodicals, 3 think tanks, 13 academic journals and 2 colleges and 54 universities.
Next, various keywords or phrases that appeared in multiple sources were identified and
sorted into various categories. One set of categories involved whether the words were positive or
negative towards the Confucius Institutes. Words were classified as positive if they were
frequently used to describe the beneficial functions of Confucius Institutes. Words were
classified as negative if they were frequently used to signify the political or organizational threats
Confucius Institutes may pose.
Another set of categories involved whether the words would likely be used to describe
various topics; they would be classified as “political” if they tended to be used when discussing
soft power or the rise of China or “academic” if they were used to discuss academic integrity at
the universities or colleges that hosted Confucius Institutes. Then, the entire list of words was
counted in the full text of the articles and transcripts that were gathered to determine the
frequency in which the keywords appeared in the text. The chart in Figure 1 below shows how
the keywords were assigned by categories and the frequency in which they appeared in the pool
of articles.
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Figure 4.1. Categorization of Keywords

Word Categories
Positive

Sum of Positive
Negative

Sum of Negative
Political

Sum of Political
Academic Integrity

Words
culture/cultural
Language
teach/teaching
Education
Promote
Bridge
Outreach
Propaganda
Threat
Funding
Nationalism
charm offensive
Legitimacy
Criticism
controversy/controversial
censor/censorship/self-censorship
spying
soft power
political
diplomacy
rise
propaganda
threat
competition
China's Rise/rise of China
charm offensive
legitimacy
patriotic
spying
propaganda
freedom
censor/censorship/self-censorship
integrity

Sum of Academic Integrity

Count
2123
1785
1162
712
236
78
47
6143
132
129
62
54
43
33
27
30
24
1
535
896
532
312
293
132
129
100
47
43
33
6
1
2524
132
59
24
14
229

As the above chart displays, “language,” “culture” and “cultural” were the positive words
most prominently used while “propaganda” and “threat” were the most-used negative words.
“Soft power” was overwhelmingly mentioned under the political category, while “propaganda”
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was most-used in the academic category. It should be noted that there was intentional overlap
with the keyword “propaganda,” which appears in the “Negative,” “Political” and “Academic
Integrity” categories. The keyword could not selectively be assigned to either the “Political” or
“Academic Integrity” category as it was used to discuss both concerns with increasing Chinese
soft power and academic interference; however, its appearance in articles and transcripts
signified that at least one of those aforementioned topics was discussed, meaning that the more
negative or threatening aspects of the Confucius Institutes were being discussed.
Each article used for this analysis was also coded by type of source (i.e. whether it was an
academic journal article, an article for a newspaper or magazine, a television or radio transcript,
a university press release, etc.). When analyzed by source type (as seen in Figure 2 below),
positive language was unsurprisingly overwhelmingly used for university newspaper articles and
press releases.
Figure 4.2. Word Categories by Source Type
Words Counted
(Classified by
Source Type)
Academic
Internet Article
Newspaper/Magazine
Radio Transcript
Think Tank
TV Transcript
University
Grand Total

Positive
2158
243
628
98
201
58
2757
6143

Negative
279
47
70
10
83
13
33
535

Political
1599
121
152
66
403
43
140
2524

Academic
Integrity
100
35
28
5
41
12
8
229

This data also suggest that the framing of the Confucius Institutes was fairly balanced in
academic journals and television and radio broadcasts, as these sources used words that stressed
the language and cultural aspects of the Confucius Institutes while also addressing political
issues such soft power. However, it is notable that the articles found in academic journals had
the highest frequency of vocabulary suggesting concerns of preserving academic integrity among
99
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all the source types. Finally, think tank publications were the only category of source type where
vocabulary suggesting political concerns was used more than the generally positive category of
words that stress language and culture; in fact, they doubled the positive category.
Each article was also coded by author type (e.g. was the author a journalist, a professor, a
policy analyst, a university representative or student writer, etc.). Analysis by the type of author
(Figure 4.3) yielded similar results to source types.
Figure 4.3. Word Categories by Author Type
Words Counted
(Classified by
Author Type)
Academic
Journalist
Policy
University
Grand Total

Positive
2224
924
238
2757
6143

Negative
255
123
124
33
535

Political
1552
276
556
140
2524

Academic
Integrity
107
70
44
8
229

Academics were the author type most concerned with academic integrity, policy analysts
were most concerned with political issues, and university officials or student writers primarily
used positive vocabulary in their coverage of the Confucius Institutes. Also notable in this
analysis is that the Confucius Institutes were generally framed positively by journalists, though
many also used words suggesting that political issues were raised in their coverage of the
Confucius Institutes.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the think tank articles that were overtly expressed
wariness over the presence of Confucius Institutes on American university campuses featured
vocabulary that suggested that the author’s concerns were primarily political. Between two of
the articles,57 the word “propaganda” is used 31 times and the phrase “soft power” is used 37
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times. A potential reason for this result is that think tanks have organizational interests; for
example, a security studies think tank may have additional incentives to push their research
towards identifying and analyzing perceived political and military threats and issuing more
hawkish policy prescriptions.

4.3

Summary
The results of the content analysis of media coverage and academic articles on the

Confucius Institutes emphasize two things. First, in the various types of coverage thus far, the
Confucius Institutes have been framed neutrally, if not positively. Thus far, the overwhelmingly
high use of words like “language,” “culture,” and “teach” indicate that the institutes have been
framed to emphasize that they are cultural outreach programs rather than menacing organizations.
Second, even when concerns are raised about the Confucius Institutes, the issue at hand tends to
be related to soft power competition rather than concerns over preserving academic integrity.
However, drawing conclusions on how coverage of the Confucius Institutes affects the
formulation of American foreign policy from this analysis can be difficult due to a theoretical
loop with causality because it cannot be definitively determined whether mass media drives
public opinion or public opinion drives mass media. There are also many other factors that drive
public opinion and American foreign policy that have little to do with the Confucius Institutes or
even Chinese foreign policy. For example, long military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq in
the early twenty-first century and a prolonged economic recession have led to the American
public being largely weary of American engagement in international affairs, military or

Kurlantzick, China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power (New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Policy Brief No. 47, 2006), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf
(accessed February 12, 2011).
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otherwise. 58 Attitudes held by the American public on foreign policy in general resembles
Wippkopf’s “isolationists” or Mead’s “Jeffersonians” more now than they had in 2004 when the
Confucius Institutes were first established. This, rather than increased Chinese aggression in
Asian territorial disputes, may be the primary reason that the so-called “pivot” to Asia became an
attractive policy option to the Obama administration in 2010.
The efficacy of soft power as a foreign policy tool remains under debate. However, if
Chinese leadership decides that soft power will continue to be an element of Chinese foreign
policy, then policy prescriptions can still be made. The Confucius Institutes will be an integral
part of China’s strategy to improve American public opinion on China, which may ultimately
shape American foreign policy towards China. The American public apparently still has deep
ambiguity over whether or not China presents an economic or military threat to the United States,
as evidenced by a recent Gallup poll on China’s relationship with the United States.59 If the
American public is still “on the fence” with its overall perception of China, then positively
framing the Confucius Institutes in media coverage will, at least, not hurt Chinese foreign policy
objectives. If met with less local resistance, the Confucius Institutes will be able to promote
Chinese language and culture more effectively, making China less threatening as a whole to the
American public .
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The Confucius Institutes are Chinese government-backed nonprofit organizations that
promote Chinese language and culture. The Confucius Institutes that are housed on collegiate
campuses are designed to complement Chinese language and cultural studies at those colleges
and universities by providing teachers, curriculums, textbooks and other educational resources
and materials. The CCP established these institutes in 2004 and recruited the revered Chinese
figure, Confucius, to serve as the organization’s namesake. Confucius was specifically chosen to
represent the organization to stress the organization’s focus on education and culture.
However, the establishment of Confucius Institutes has been a source of controversy,
especially in the United States. The controversy stems from the institutes’ close ties with and the
financial, administrative, and political support they receive from the Chinese government.
Critics have had two primary concerns. The first is that the Confucius Institutes would provide
the Chinese government access to increase Chinese soft power by issuing propaganda. The
second concern is that the presence of Confucius Institutes on American collegiate campuses
would interfere with American academia by issuing propaganda or either overtly or covertly
preventing research in topics that are sensitive to the Chinese government.
This thesis extensively reviewed various theories on international relations and
nationalism to show how studies on China’s rise have been theoretically framed. International
relations liberals have pointed to how China has responsibly participated in the international
system; China will not attempt to change the current international system that has benefitted
them so well in the latter 20th century. Constructivists would make similar arguments about
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Chinese participation in the international system and how it has changed their identities and
socialized them.
However, international relations realists tend to argue that tension will inevitably rise
between China and the United States due to the changing structure of international power. 1 Even
analysts who believe that China remains relatively weaker than the United States caution that
miscalculations in relations between the two countries have the potential to escalate into crises. 2
Assertive Chinese nationalism is also a source of concern among realist observers, as “few
aspects of a powerful China trouble Western leaders more than the emergence of an assertive
nationalism under an authoritarian regime. 3 Realist analysts, who would be largely concerned
with the threat that a rising China presents, would also apply their competitive, zero-sum world
view to Chinese soft power as well: “[any] gain in Chinese soft power is interpreted as a loss of
Western/US soft power.”4
Others argue that this view is both unnecessary and problematic. Gries has stated that
despite differing material interests between China and the United States, “[neither] the structure
of the world system nor the cultural differences between China and America make conflict
between China and the United States inevitable.”5 Suzuki has argued that “fears of challenges to
Western/US primacy [have resulted] in myopia and fantasy within analyses of Chinese soft
power.”6 As a result, these analysts have lumped together all of China’s political leadership into
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a monolithic, revisionist entity7 and “[glossed] over any diverse views on Chinese soft power
which exist within the PRC in order to prove the existence of a ‘China threat.’” 8 Instead, Suzuki
makes a liberal argument, stating that China’s search for soft power may be driven by its desire
to counter negative Western opinion – to promote the “image of a ‘responsible power’ which
upholds the international normative status quo.”9
This thesis also reviewed theories on the relationship between media coverage, public
opinion, and foreign policymaking. As the United States is a democracy, elected officials need
to maintain a level of responsiveness to public opinion. The evolution of mass media has
affected the methods and frequency in which information is presented to and processed by the
American public. Therefore, understanding how the Confucius Institutes are being framed
would be important to multiple affected groups: those involved with the establishment or
administration of Confucius Institutes, academics and students at collegiate campuses that host
the Confucius Institutes, and both Chinese and American policymakers.
Content analysis of coverage on the Confucius Institutes revealed that they have been
framed neutrally, if not positively. “Positive” words like “language” and “culture” were used far
more frequently than “negative” words like “propaganda” or “threat.” It also revealed that
political issues involving Chinese soft power were discussed far more frequently in coverage on
the Confucius Institutes than concerns about preserving academic integrity at the campuses that
host the Confucius Institutes.
The objective of this thesis was to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the
Confucius Institutes were established and designed to function and to illustrate how the debates
in the United States concerning the Confucius Institutes are driven more by the politics of
7
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increasing competition between China and the United States rather than concerns about
preserving academic integrity. The review of the literature on China’s rise and the theories that
frame it illustrated how analysts are focused on China’s rising power and international status
relative to the United States and how many of these analysts view the rise of China as antithetical
to American interests. Soft power has become an especially salient topic among many Chinese
and Western analysts and policymakers concerned with increased competition between the
United States and China. The Confucius Institutes, despite their focus on less overtly political
issues such as language and cultural education, have gotten pulled into the larger debate over
Chinese and American competition in both hard and soft power. The content analysis of
coverage on the Confucius Institutes provides the most compelling evidence of this, proving that
issues of soft power are discussed significantly more frequently by critics than academic
integrity. Though the Confucius Institutes are undoubtedly soft power initiatives directed by the
Chinese government, their primary activities are educational rather than political. Being so
frequently associated with a topic that signals a threat to American interests not only negatively
affects Chinese foreign affairs and grand strategy, but also the academic institutions that rely on
the Confucius Institutes for language program funding.
One flaw with this study is how the articles and transcripts were aggregated for the
database. Most of the academic articles involving the Confucius Institutes that were published in
major journals were included in the database for analysis. However, though the other articles
included in the database represent a sizable sample of what was broadcast over radio and
television or published in American newspapers and university websites, by no means were all of
the available sources included. Furthermore, only the websites of universities that host
Confucius Institutes were searched for related articles. Future studies regarding the Confucius
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Institutes in the United States would likely benefit from widening the search and updating the
database, especially if articles regarding Confucius Institutes were written at colleges or
universities that rejected establishing them.
Future studies could also gain valuable insight on how the Confucius Institutes actually
function by conducting interviews with the administrators and faculty employed on American
campuses that host Confucius Institutes. Unfortunately, available time and the intended scope of
this project made conducting interviews a practical impossibility, as it would have required the
involvement of the institutional review boards of multiple universities in order to comply with
federal human research guidelines.
Finally, as China rises in power and international status, polls regarding American
attitudes towards China are likely to be conducted more frequently. As more poll data becomes
available, a study cross-referencing the evolution of American public opinion on China with a
comprehensive content analysis of media regarding China and the Confucius Institutes over the
same time period, may yield better analysis of the relationship between media framing, public
opinion and policymaking.
Despite this study’s limitations, recommendations or policy prescriptions can be made to
involved parties based on the results of this study’s content analysis. First, American
policymakers should focus less on the Confucius Institutes as a source of a soft power
controversy between the United States and China. There is no substantial evidence to support
claims that the Chinese government is using the Confucius Institutes to spread falsehoods; the
focus of most of the established institutes thus far has been on promoting Chinese language and
culture. While some analysts may find Chinese initiatives to increase soft power and influence
disconcerting for American interests, it would be a mistake to form policies that would try to
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suppress these initiatives. The proliferation of Confucius Institutes can be viewed positively as it
represents increased Chinese engagement in the international community. Moreover, soft power
is driven by more than just the attractiveness of language and culture. Chinese soft power,
though steadily increasing, is not yet in a position to overtake American soft power, even as
American soft power has diminished in the early twenty-first century.
Though the increase in Chinese soft power and competition between China and the
United States should not be an area of concern for American academics and collegiate
administrators per say, academics and administrators should remain vigilant over preserving
academic integrity at their institutions. Overt attempts to stifle controversial topics have been
successfully averted by American universities in the past; officials at Stanford University
infamously rebuffed Hanban’s suggestion to refrain from discussing Tibet.10 Covert suppression
of controversial topics, namely through self-censorship, remains the more likely threat to
academic integrity. However, this is not a unique situation presented by the establishment of
Confucius Institutes. Academics must be self-reflective and have the ability to identify the
ideologies and biases they apply in their research and observations. The establishment of
Confucius Institutes on academic campuses and its potential to influence American academia is
just one more layer that academics need to be aware of when conducting and sharing research.
To ensure the long-term success of the Confucius Institutes, Hanban should take steps to
make them seem less threatening to international, and particularly American, observers.
Increasing organizational transparency in terms of funding and curriculums should be a priority
for Confucius Institutes and the collegiate organizations that host them. Though some American
analysts may always view soft power in zero-sum terms between China and the United States,
10

D.D. Guttenplan, “Critics Worry about the Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses,” The New York
Times, March 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-of-chinese-instituteson-uscampuses.html?_r=2&sq=Confucius%20Institute&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all (accessed March 20, 2012).
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these analysts will have fewer sources for skepticism if they are able to trace exactly how the
program’s money is being spent and the program materials prove not to be propagandistic. The
recent establishment of the Confucius Institute U.S. Center in Washington D.C. 11 presents an
opportunity to increase organizational transparency: if Hanban empowers the new regional
center to make decisions regarding finances and curriculum content for Confucius Institutes
housed in American collegiate campuses, then analysts and policymakers may be less inclined to
view the Confucius Institutes as a Beijing-driven propaganda mouthpiece. Confucius Institutes
should also work to host more cultural events that are open to the general public, which will
increase transparency and engagement with the local communities in which the institutes operate.
Finally, Chinese policymakers should remember to be patient. The Chinese government
is spending a lot of financial and political resources on the worldwide establishment of
Confucius Institutes and other soft power initiatives; however, soft power is not a foreign policy
tool that yields immediate, observable results. If nothing else, the successful proliferation of
Confucius Institutes that focus on promoting language and culture and continued cultural
engagement between China and the United States provide opportunities to dispel what Suzuki
refers to as myopia held by foreign policy analysts. 12

11

“China inaugurates Confucius Institute U.S. Center in Washington,” Xinhua, November 21, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/21/c_132906369.htm (accessed December 7, 2013).
12
Suzuki.
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Appendix: Content Analysis Tables

Figure 4.1. Categorization of Keywords

Word Categories
Positive

Sum of Positive
Negative

Sum of Negative
Political

Sum of Political
Academic Integrity

Sum of Academic Integrity

Words
culture/cultural
Language
teach/teaching
Education
Promote
Bridge
Outreach
Propaganda
Threat
Funding
Nationalism
charm offensive
Legitimacy
Criticism
controversy/controversial
censor/censorship/self-censorship
spying
soft power
political
diplomacy
rise
propaganda
threat
competition
China's Rise/rise of China
charm offensive
legitimacy
patriotic
spying
propaganda
freedom
censor/censorship/self-censorship
integrity

Count
2123
1785
1162
712
236
78
47
6143
132
129
62
54
43
33
27
30
24
1
535
896
532
312
293
132
129
100
47
43
33
6
1
2524
132
59
24
14
229
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Figure 4.2. Word Categories by Source Type
Words Counted
(Classified by
Source Type)
Academic
Internet Article
Newspaper/Magazine
Radio Transcript
Think Tank
TV Transcript
University
Grand Total

Positive
2158
243
628
98
201
58
2757
6143

Negative
279
47
70
10
83
13
33
535

Political
1599
121
152
66
403
43
140
2524

Academic
Integrity
100
35
28
5
41
12
8
229

Negative
255
123
124
33
535

Political
1552
276
556
140
2524

Academic
Integrity
107
70
44
8
229

Figure 4.3. Word Categories by Author Type
Words Counted
(Classified by
Author Type)
Academic
Journalist
Policy
University
Grand Total

Positive
2224
924
238
2757
6143
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Figure 4.4. College/University Websites Searched
College/University Name

Type

Arizona State University
Bryant University
Cleveland State University
George Mason University News
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
Kansas State University
Miami Dade College
Miami University
Michigan State University
Middle Tennessee State University
New Mexico State University
North Carolina State University
Pace University
Penn State University
Perdue University
Pfeiffer University
Portland State University
Presbyterian College
Rutgers University
San Diego State University
State University of New York at Binghamton University
State University of New York at Buffalo
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Texas A&M
Troy University
University of Akron
University of Alaska Anchorage
University of Arizona
University of California at Los Angeles
University of Central Arkansas
University of Chicago
University of Hawaii at Manoa
University of Iowa
University of Kentucky
University of Maryland
University of Massachusetts
University of Memphis
University of Michigan
University of Minnesota
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

University
University
University
University
University
University
College
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
College
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
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University of New Hampshire
University of Oklahoma
University of Oregon
University of Pittsburgh
University of Rhode Island
University of South Carolina
University of South Florida
University of Texas at Dallas
University of Texas at San Antonio
University of Utah
University of Wisconsin-Platteville
Valparaiso University
Wayne State University
Webster University
West Kentucky University
Western Michigan University

University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University
University

Total Colleges
Total Universities

2
54
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